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JUSTICE OR INJUSTICE FOR THE POOR?: A LOOK AT THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS
ON LEGAL SERVICES
Upon enacting the Legal Services Corporation Act in 1974, Congress
created the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), which provides federal fund-
ing to grantees that perform legal services for low-income individuals. In
recent years, Congress has enacted restrictions upon grantees' receipt of
such federal funding, limiting the legal services these legal aid attorneys
can provide to their clients. This move has sparked great debate. Propo-
nents of the restrictions argue that they are needed to correct abuse and
misuse of the legal services program, while opponents argue that the re-
strictions only harm low-income individuals.
In this Note, the author addresses this controversial issue by first exam-
ining the purpose and history of the Legal Services Corporation. The author
then examines recent Supreme Court opinions analyzing the constitutionality
of attaching conditions to the use of federal funds. In applying the "uncon-
stitutional conditions" doctrine recently set out by the Supreme Court, the
author argues that many of Congress's recent restrictions are not only
harmful; they are unconstitutional.
The author argues thai many of the restrictions Congress recently has
enacted interfere with the protected attorney-client relationship and impli-
cate First Amendment concerns. Specifically, the author argues that the
restrictions prohibiting welfare-reform advocacy and abortion-related liti-
gation constitute viewpoint discrimination and thus are unconstitutional.
Also unconstitutional are the restrictions on lobbying and influencing the
government because they are impermissibly overbroad. Finally, the author
argues that restrictions requiring affiliate organizations of grantees to satis-
fy certain program integrity requirements unconstitutionally restrict
grantees' right to engage in prohibited speech or activities using non-LSC
funds.
The author concludes the Note by arguing that in enacting the recent
restrictions, Congress has thwarted the purpose of the Legal Services Cor-
poration Act. Instead of providing justice for low-income individuals, the
restrictions only create more injustice.
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The government must abstain from regulating speech when
the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective
of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.'
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of
state legislation which, by words of express divestment,
seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result
is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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exchange for a valuable privilege the state threatens other-
wise to withhold .... It is inconceivable that guarantees
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may be
thus manipulated out of existence.2
INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Omnibus Con-
solidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (1996 OCRAA).3
Within this massive appropriations bill, the Republican-controlled Congress
made significant changes to the Legal Services Corporation Act (LSC
Act) 4-the Act that authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to
provide funding grants to legal aid programs across the country.5 The legal
aid programs use LSC funds, along with nonfederal funds,6 to provide free
legal services to low-income clients.7 In the 1996 OCRAA, Congress re-
duced funding to the Legal Services Corporation by thirty percent' and en-
acted far-reaching restrictions on the recipients (grantees) of LSC funding.9
2 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1925).
Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. Since 1980, the LSC has operated without authorization and
survives only through annual appropriations bills. The 1997 funding is in the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. The pro-
posed appropriations bill for 1998 can be found in H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-405, at
H10828 (1997), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2440, 2510-12.
' Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)).
' In addition to the typical nonprofit legal aid programs, the LSC may distribute
federal funds to individuals, partnerships, firms, corporations, and state and local gov-
ernments as long as the grants are "for the purpose of providing legal assistance to
eligible clients." 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a)(1)(A) (1994).
6 In 1996, LSC grantees received 324 million dollars from private donors in addi-
tion to the federal funds distributed through the LSC. See David E. Rovella, Will Court
Win Spur GOP Backlash?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at Al.
7 The declaration of purpose for the Act is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994). See
infra note 16 and accompanying text.
8 The 1996 OCRAA reduced LSC funding from 400 million dollars to 278 million.
See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at
1321-50. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 and the 1998 proposed
bill basically maintained the 1996 funding level by authorizing the funding of 283 mil-
lion dollars. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 110 Stat. at 3009-59;
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-405, at H10827; see also William Booth, Attacked as Left-
Leaning, Legal Services Suffers Deep Cuts, WASH. POST, June 1, 1996, at Al (describ-
ing reductions in LSC funding).
9 See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504.
Congress continued these restrictions for 1997. See 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appro-
priations Act § 502; see also Claudia MacLachlan, Legal Services Fights Back, NAT'L
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These new restrictions, combined with existing ones, severely curtail the
legal services grantees are able to provide. For example, legal aid attorneys
are prohibited from "influencing" the government, restricted as to which
clients they may represent, and forbidden from pursuing certain types of
claims."° Moreover, Congress extended the restrictions to include non-LSC
funds received by grantees."
Proponents of the legislation argue that the new restrictions are needed
to reign in legal aid attorneys misusing the LSC fund ing by pursuing their
own political agendas rather than using the funds to provide basic legal
services poor people need. 2 Critics, however, contend that the new restric-
tions were driven by a conservative ideology that is more concerned about
protecting those in power and squelching disagreement with their policies
toward the poor than improving the legal representation that grantees pro-
vide to the poor." They argue that the new restrictions will only harm poor
people by limiting their access to justice." Regardless of one's particular
viewpoint on the LSC Act, the new congressional restrictions and accompa-
nying LSC regulations raise difficult constitutional questions about
Congress's ability to condition the receipt of federal funds on a grantee's
agreement to forfeit certain rights. 5 This Note addresses whether the re-
L.J., July 8, 1996, at Al (describing the new restrictions); James Ridgeway, The Legal
Straitjacket, VILLAGE VOICE (New York), Aug. 6, 1996, at 20 (describing the new
restrictions).
10 Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504.
See id. § 504(d)(1).
12 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Jus-
tice, State and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Comm., 104th Cong. 9, 129
(1996) [hereinafter Hearings]; Ruth Larson, Heat Turns up on Legal Services Corp.:
Coalition Slams Agency as House Panel Begins Probe, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at
A4; Catherine Trevison, Helping Poor with Some Legal Aid Now Taboo, TENNESSEAN,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 1A. See generally James T. Bennett & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Poverty,
Politics, and Jurisprudence: Illegalities at the Legal Services Corporation, in LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION: THE ROBBER BARONS OF THE POOR? 113, 117-29 (Wash.
Legal Found. 1985); Orrin G. Hatch, Myth and Reality at the Legal Services Corpora-
tion, in THE ROBBER BARONS OF THE POOR?, supra, at 3-13.
" See Booth, supra note 8; Claire Cooper, Suit Seeks to End Limits on Legal-Aid
Networks: They Say Restrictions Hurt Their Ability to Aid Clients, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Jan. 10, 1997, at A4 ("The restrictions 'can most plausibly be understood as an effort
by Congress to suppress the expression of certain ideas, and limit the rights of certain
groups, that Congress now disfavors for ideological reasons."'); Ridgeway, supra note
9, at 20.
14 See Steven Stycos, Revoking Legal Services: Republicans Want to Keep Lawyers
From the Poor, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1, 1996, at 29.
"s Restrictions that limit an attorney's ability to represent clients have been held
unconstitutional outside of the funding context. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978) (holding that a practicing lawyer who advised a gathering of women with respect
830 [Vol. 6:3
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strictions violate the constitutional rights of the grantees and their clients.
Part I reviews the history of the LSC, its current framework, and the
impact of the new restrictions on legal aid programs. Part II reviews the
United States Supreme Court's analysis for evaluating the constitutionality
of restrictions attached to government funding. Part III applies the Court's
constitutional analysis to the restrictions Congress placed on LSC grantees.
I. THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS
This Part establishes the context of the new congressional restrictions by
reviewing the purpose and history of the Legal Services Act and discussing
the new restrictions and how they impact legal aid attorneys and clients.
A. The Purpose and History of the Legal Services Corporation Act
The purpose of the Legal Services Corporation Act (LSC Act) is to
provide "equal access to the system of justice ... [for] those who would
otherwise be unable to afford adequate legal counsel."' 6 The Act recogniz-
es that for most low-income individuals the costs of retaining an attorney
to their legal rights was not subject to disciplinary action under the First Amendment);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that an injunc-
tion that restrained a brotherhood from maintaining and carrying out a plan for advising
injured workers to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers denied
members rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments); NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (holding that under the First Amendment Virginia may not
prohibit the NAACP from advising prospective litigants to seek assistance and may not
make it a crime to refer prospective litigants to an attorney). See generally RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 171 (1992).
16 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994). The statute states:
(1) there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation
for individuals who seek redress of grievances;
(2) there is a need to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be
otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel and to continue the present vital
legal services program;
(3) providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate
legal counsel will serve best the ends of justice and assist in improving opportuni-
ties for low-income persons consistent with the purposes of this chapter;
(4) for many of our citizens, the availability of legal services has reaffirmed faith
in our government of laws;
(5) to preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free from the
influence of or use by it of political pressures; and
(6) attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to protect the best
interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of the legal profession.
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are prohibitive. 17 Without access to legal counsel, low-income individuals
are, for all practical purposes, excluded from a system of justice that claims
to be available to all.' Thus, the purpose of the Act is to provide low-in-
come individuals access to the courts where none would otherwise exist. 9
The Act established the Legal Services Corporation, a private,' non-
profit corporation located in the District of Columbia, for "the purpose of
providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings
or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance."'" The
LSC administers grants to qualified programs and ensures that grantees
abide by the restrictions placed upon them as a condition for receiving the
funding.' While the LSC provides funding, it does not represent eligible
clients.2  Congress designed the program to be highly decentralized.
Rather than utilizing a centralized delivery mechanism, the actual delivery
of legal services is done by locally controlled, nonprofit corporations located
See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 59-62 (1976); JAMES E.
MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK 176-81 (1993); Mark
Green, The Gross Legal Product: "How Much Justice Can You Afford?", in VERDICTS
ON LAWYERS 63, 77-79 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976).
1" See Roger C. Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor, 26 VILL. L. REV.
521 (1981). Cramton writes:
For most of our history, the situation with respect to civil legal aid for the poor
could well have been summed up in Anatole France's famous gibe that: "The law,
in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." The courts were open to all, but only the
well-to-do could afford the lawyer who was necessary for the vindication of
rights.
Id. at 522; see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1955) (Black, J.) (opining that
"[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has").
19 See Cramton, supra note 18, at 524-25.
2 For First Amendment analysis, however, the LSC is considered a governmental
entity, notwithstanding its declaration that it is a private corporation. See infra Part
III.B.1.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1994).
" See id. § 2996e. "The Corporation shall have authority to insure the compliance
of recipients and their employees with the provisions of this subchapter and the rules,
regulations, and guidelines promulgated pursuant to this subchapter, and to termi-
nate . . . financial support to a recipient which fails to comply." Id. § 2996e(b)(1)(A).
2' See id. § 2996e(c)(1). The LSCA states that the Corporation itself shall not
participate in litigation unless the Corporation is a party, or a recipient of the
Corporation is a party, or a recipient is representing an eligible client in litigation
in which the interpretation of this subchapter or a regulation promulgated under
this subchapter is an issue, and shall not participate on behalf of any client other
than itself.
Id.
See Booth, supra note 8.
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throughout the country.' These local legal aid offices set their own priori-
ties and are generally run independently from the LSC.2
The LSC's roots can be traced to the Legal Services Program in the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which was established in 1966 as
part of Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty.27 Although the OEO Legal Ser-
vices Program had scant funding and targeted mainly urban areas,' both
conservatives and liberals attacked the program.29 Conservatives viewed it
as interventionist law reform, while liberals thought of it as little more than
a service function.' In the early 1970s, conservative political opposition
sought to eliminate the OEO entirely, including the legal services pro-
gram.31 To this end, President Nixon appointed Howard Phillips to disman-
tle the OEO.32 When this effort failed, however, Congress and the Nixon
administration focused on establishing a congressionally funded, but politi-
cally independent, Legal Services Corporation.33 On July 25, 1974, after
many compromises and amendments, President Nixon signed into law the
Legal Services Corporation Act.'
Notwithstanding the attempt to make the LSC politically independent,
the controversy over federally funded legal services to the poor continued
after its inception in 1974.3' Although President Carter bolstered the LSC
in the late 1970s, President Reagan attempted to eliminate it during the
See Testimony in Fiscal Year 1997 House of Representative Appropriations For
Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice,
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
104th Cong. 208 (1996) (statement of Alexander D. Forger, President, Legal Services
Corporation).
26 See id.; Joseph A. Dailing, Their Finest Hour: Lawyers, Legal Aid and Public
Service in Illinois, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 7, 11 (1995). It is interesting to note that legal
aid programs usually are governed by a board of directors largely composed of local
attorneys appointed by local bar associations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996c(a)(C) (1994).
27 See CHARLES K. ROWLEY, THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 6-11 (1992); see also AUERBACH, supra note
17, at 269-75. For a history of legal aid in America, see JOHN A. DOOLEY & ALAN W.
HOUSEMAN, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY (1984); PHILIP J. HANNON, FROM POLITICS TO
REALITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION (1976);
and Stephen K. Huber, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice: A History and Bibliography of
Legal Aid in America, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754 (1976).
' See Dailing, supra note 26, at 10.
29 See ROWLEY, supra note 21, at 10.
30 See id. at 11.
31 See Dailing, supra note 26, at 10-11.
32 See id.
31 See id.
31 See id.; Booth, supra note 8; Stycos, supra note 14, at 29.
" See ROWLEY, supra note 27, at 11-16; LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 1994 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 5 (1994); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (1997) (discussing
how the LSC Act has been controversial since its inception).
1998] 833
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1980s.16 While the Reagan administration failed to eliminate the LSC, it
succeeded in cutting LSC funding and "institut[ing] a number of other
changes ostensibly designed to rein in the perceived left-wing radicals alleg-
edly in control of legal services programs across the country."37 Moreover,
Congress began an extensive monitoring and evaluation process to search
for suspected wrongdoing and misuse of congressional funds. 38 Congressio-
nal Republicans continued to attack the LSC in the latter part of the 1980s
and early 1990s. 39
With the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, the conservatives again
tried to eliminate the LSC, but failed when President Clinton vetoed their
initial budget plan.40 In an apparent compromise, however, Congress agreed
to retain the LSC, albeit at a sharply reduced funding level, in exchange for
the enactment of new restrictions on grantees. 4' Because LSC funding re-
quires annual appropriations, the future of the LSC remains uncertain from
year to year. Furthermore, the retention of Congress by the Republicans in
the 1996 elections means the LSC's harshest critics again will be seeking to
eliminate funding altogether.
B. An Overview of the New Congressional Restrictions and Their Effects on
Legal Aid Attorneys and Clients
The 1996 OCRAA imposes nineteen restrictions 42 in addition to the ten
or so existing restrictions in the LSC Act. 43 The restrictions fall into four
general categories: (1) a prohibition on influencing government, (2) re-
strictions on which clients grantees may represent, (3) restrictions on the
type of cases grantees may take, and (4) restrictions on how attorneys repre-
36 See Dailing, supra note 26, at 18.
3 Id. at 21. For example,
[i]n 1983, LSC published a new regulation outlining the composition of governing
bodies of LSC grantees. In the future, while LSC grantee boards would continue
to be composed of sixty percent attorneys, the majority of these attorneys would
need to be appointed by the largest bar association in the program's service area.
The assumption seems to have been that local attorneys would limit the actions of
legal services programs deemed to be controversial.
Id.
38 Compare Hatch, supra note 12, at 4-10, with Dailing, supra note 26, at 22 (offer-
ing different perspectives on the purpose of the legal services monitoring program).
" See Stycos, supra note 14, at 29.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 30.
42 See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1352-56.
13 See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b) (1994).
834 [Vol. 6:3
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sent clients.44 Furthermore, all the restrictions apply to a grantee's non-LSC
funds as well.
The first category of restrictions prohibits legal aid attorneys from influ-
encing government. Grantees cannot attempt to influence the issuance or
revocation of any executive order or any federal, state, or local government
regulation,4" nor can they attempt to influence any "adjudicatory proceed-
ing" that is "designed for the formulation or modification of any agency
policy of general applicability and future effect."46 Grantees cannot partici-
pate in any legislative advocacy including "attempts to influence the passage
or defeat of any legislation, constitutional amendment, referendum, initiative,
or any similar procedure of the Congress or a State or local legislative
body."47 Grantees also cannot engage in lobbying48 or any political activi-
ty,49 nor are they allowed to conduct training programs that advocate a
"particular public policy or encourag[e] a political activity."" These new
restrictions "are far more extensive than those included in prior appropria-
tions provisions or in the LSC Act . . . ."" Indeed, a review of the regula-
tions promulgated by the LSC in implementing these restrictions reveals
extremely broad and far-reaching rules.5 2 For example, the regulations set
forth an absolute prohibition (grantees cannot use LSC or non-LSC funds)
on "grass-roots lobbying" by a recipient and its employees.5 3 Grass-roots
lobbying is defined as any form of communication that contains a direct
suggestion to the public to contact public officials in support of any legis-
lation, regulations, or administrative board decisions. 4 Legislation is fur-
ther defined as any action or proposal by a legislative body intended to
prescribe law or public policy.5 Other regulations prohibit participation in
4 See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504(a).
45 See id. § 504(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(5) (1994).
46 Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504(a)(3).
"' Id. § 504(a)(4).
4' The fiscal year 1995 appropriations bill restricted grantees from lobbying. See
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 403(b)(1), 108 Stat. 1724, 1759 (1994)
(applying the restrictions from the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-515,
§ 606(a), 104 Stat. 2101, 2148-51 (1990)).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(4) (1994) (referring to specific prohibitions in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996f(a)(6)) (1994); id. § 2996e(d)(3)-(4).
SO Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504(d)(12).
5' 62 Fed. Reg. 19,400, 19,401 (1997).
52 See 45 C.F.R. § 1612.1-.11 (1996).
I ld. § 1612.4.
s4 See id. § 1612.2(a)(1).
5 See id. § 1612.2(b)(1). Public policy means "an overall plan embracing the gener-
al goals and procedures of any governmental body and pending or proposed statutes,
rules, and regulations." Id.
1998]
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bar association activities related to restricted activities, 5 6 training that advo-
cates a particular public policy or trains participants to engage in activities
prohibited by the Act,57 organizing a group in any manner,58 or engaging
in illegal activity at any time.59 "Illegal" activity includes any activity that
violates the LSC Act, whether engaged in during or outside of working
hours.6' These are just a few examples of the extensiveness of the regula-
tions related to influencing government.
When the LSC rules are viewed as a whole, it appears that the only
interaction a legal aid attorney may have with a governmental body occurs
when he or she is representing an individual client in an administrative
hearing or responding to a specific request from a governmental body.6'
Even the narrow exception for administrative hearings is severely undercut
by another regulation that completely prohibits a legal aid attorney from
challenging any government agency's regulations related to "welfare" re-
form.
62
In addition to the general prohibition against influencing government,
the 1996 OCRAA specifically prohibits grantees from participating in any
welfare-reform advocacy. 63 "Welfare reform" is very broadly defined and
includes all of the provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, except for the Child Support Enforce-
ment Provisions.' As noted above, an exception is made for the represen-
56 See id. § 1612.5(c)(5). Recipient attorneys are allowed to participate fully and
actively in bar association activities provided that the bar does not use recipient resourc-
es or identify the recipient with any activities proscribed by the regulations. See id.
Thus, "when a bar association activity is devoted to a prohibited activity, such as partic-
ipating in a meeting whose principal purpose is to determine and communicate the bar's
position on pending or proposed legislation or regulations; recipient attorneys must
either decline to participate or participate solely on their own time." 62 Fed. Reg. at
19,402.
"' See 45 C.F.R. § 1612.8. For example, under this expanded prohibition on training,
a grantee cannot train participants on how to engage in class actions, lobbying, welfare
reform, and the like. See id.
8 See id. § 1612.9. This prohibition extends to both LSC and non-LSC funding.
59 See id. § 1612.7(b)(3).
o See Permissible Activities Using Non-LSC Funds, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,403.
61 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1612.5-.6.
62 See infra text accompanying note 63. Needless to say, a significant portion of
legal representation to low-income clients involves governmental agencies that provide
"welfare" benefits.
63 See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, ] 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321, 1356. No funds are to be used by grantees to
"initiate[ ] legal representation, or participate[ ] in any other way, in litigation, lobbying,
or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State Welfare system . . .
Id.; see 45 C.F.R. § 1639 (1996) (promulgating accompanying regulations).
" 45 C.F.R. § 1639.2(a) (1996). The interim rule defined "welfare" system to in-
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tation of a client seeking specific relief from a welfare agency as long as the
grantee does not challenge "existing laws."'65 The LSC regulations, howev-
er, significantly limit this exception by including federal and state agency
regulations in the definition of "existing laws."' Thus, a legal aid attorney
may only seek relief according to an agency's interpretation of the law (its
regulations). The attorney, however, may not challenge the agency's inter-
pretation, even if that interpretation appears erroneous.
The new restrictions also limit the types of clients grantees may repre-
sent. Illegal aliens and many legal aliens cannot be represented.6" Similarly,
grantees may not represent individuals being evicted from public housing if
the individuals have been charged with drug crimes," nor may they repre-
sent prisoners, even for nonprison-related matters, such as divorce.69
Furthermore, the restrictions limit the types of cases grantees may ac-
cept. Prior restrictions prohibited grantees from taking fee generating cases,
criminal cases, civil cases arising out of criminal cases, labor-related activi-
ties, cases involving nontherapeutic abortions, litigation relating to desegre-
gation, and selective service cases.70 The new restrictions further prohibit
cases related to redistricting,7' all abortion-related litigation," and, as pre-
viously noted, any litigation involving an effort to challenge welfare re-
form." Recently, litigation related to assisted suicide, euthanasia, and mer-
cy killing also were restricted.74
Finally, the 1996 OCRAA affects the manner in which grantees can
represent clients. Most notable is the prohibition against filing class action
clude only "Federal and State Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC")
programs under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., and
State General Assistance, or similar State means-test programs for basic subsistence."
62 Fed. Reg at 30,764. The final rule expanded the definition to include all provisions
of the Personal Responsibility Act, including Social Security Income ("SSI") and the
Food Stamp Program. See id.
65 Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504(a)(16).
6 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,765. (discussing comments regarding the definition of "existing
law").
"' See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(a)(11).
"' See id. § 504(a)(17); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1633 (1996).
619 See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(a)(15).
70 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996f(b)(1)-(3),(6),(8)-(10) (1994).
71 See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(a)(1); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1632.3 (1996).
7 See. Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(a)(14)..
7 See 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3 (1996).
14 See Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111
Stat. 23; see also 45 C.F.R. § 1643 (1996).
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law suits.75 The Act also disallows the recovery of attorneys' fees pursuant
to federal or state statute.76 Many procedural requirements have been im-
posed, including requirements that plaintiffs be specifically identified by
name in complaints and that plaintiffs write out statements of facts upon
which complaints are based.77
In addition to imposing nineteen new restrictions on a grantee's use of
LSC funding, Congress applied the restrictions to a grantee's use of "non-
LSC,7 1 funding as well.79 Prior to the 1996 legislation, the restrictions ap-
plied to a grantee's use of private funding, but not public funding." The
1996 OCRAA, however, applied the new restrictions to all non-LSC fund-
ing, both private and public.8 This is a significant extension because public
funds are defined as "non-LSC funds derived from a Federal, State or local
government," including Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA) funds,
which often represent a major source of nonfederal funding.82
In an attempt to prevent grantees from "circumvent[ing] statutory condi-
tions on a recipient's LSC and non-LSC funds" 3 by transferring funds to
another organization, the LSC promulgated regulations that extended the
restrictions to organizations receiving funds from a grantee. In the initial
rule that the LSC promulgated on December 2, 1996, if a grantee transferred
LSC funds to another person or entity, the restrictions applied to the funds
transferred and to the non-LSC funds of the transferee.' If a grantee trans-
ferred non-LSC funds to another person or entity, the LSC restrictions still
"' See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(a)(7).
76 See id. § 504(a)(13); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1642 (1996).
'7 See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996
§ 504(a)(8).
' "Non-LSC funds means funds derived from a source other than the Corporation."
45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(d) (1996).
" See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504(d).
This section allows a grantee to use "non-LSC" funds only "if such funds are used for
the specific purposes for which such funds were received, except that such funds may
not be expended by recipients for any purpose prohibited by this Act or by the Legal
Services Corporation Act." Id. § 504(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Grantees are required
to notify in writing all non-LSC funding sources of the extension of these restrictions to
their funding. See id. § 504(d)(1).
' "Private funds means funds derived from an individual or entity other than a
governmental source or the LSC." 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(e) (1996).
8" Thus, the restrictions in the LSC Act apply to LSC funds and private funds, but
not to public funds, while the restrictions in the 1996 OCRAA apply to all LSC and
non-LSC funds (including both public and private funds). See Omnibus Consolidated
Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504(d).
82 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(f) (1996).
" Summary, Use of Non-LSC Funds, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,749, 63,752 (1996).
14 See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.7(a) (1996).
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applied to the transferred funds (but not to other funds of the transferee),
even though the transferee received no LSC funds." In essence, once
grantees received LSC funds, or transferees received LSC funds from a
grantee, all non-LSC funds of the grantee or the transferee became forever
"tainted" with the restrictions, notwithstanding that the non-LSC funds were
transferred to an organization receiving no LSC funding.
On May 21, 1997, the LSC revised these regulations after a federal
judge in Hawaii enjoined the LSC from enforcing nine of the new restric-
tions as applied to the use of non-LSC funds on the basis that the restric-
tions likely were unconstitutional.86 The LSC replaced the section that ap-
plied the restrictions to transferees of non-LSC funds87 with a new section
entitled "Program Integrity of Recipient." Under this section, a "recipient
must have objective integrity and independence from any organization that
engages in restricted activities."88 A program satisfies this criterion if "(1)
[t]he other organization is a legally separate entity; (2) the other organiza-
tion receives no transfer of LSC funds and LSC funds do not subsidize
restricted activities; (3) and the recipient is physically and financially sepa-
rate from the other organization."89 The LSC, even in its revised regula-
tions, has gone to great lengths to prevent grantees from establishing a sepa-
rate entity that uses non-LSC funds to engage in the restricted activities.9'
The new restrictions on their face are very broad and extensive. The
significant effects of the restrictions become readily apparent when one
considers the actual impact of the restrictions on legal aid attorneys and
clients. For example, the restriction on "influencing government" means that
local legal aid agencies have to remain silent as new rules and regulations
that affect poor people are written,9' and simple but effective activities, like
85 See id. § 1610.7(b).
86 See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997).
This case is discussed more fully in Part III.A.
87 See Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfers of LSC Funds, Program Integrity, 62 Fed.
Reg. 27,695, 27,696-97 (1997).
45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (1996).
89 Id. For a recipient to be physically and financially separate requires more than
keeping LSC funds separate from other funds. Rather, the recipient must have separate
personnel, separate accounting and timekeeping records, a certain degree of separation
from facilities in which restricted activities occur, and other distinguishing characteris-
tics. The determination is to be based on the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-
case basis. See id.
' Legal aid attorneys working for recipients of LSC funding also are prohibited
from engaging in the "outside practice of law." See 45 C.F.R. § 1604 (1996). Thus, a
legal aid attorney who works for a grantee is subject to the extensive restrictions when
working for the grantee and is prohibited from providing legal services on her own time
outside of work. Thus, to engage in the prohibited activities, a legal aid attorney would
have to find a nonprofit organization that either does not receive LSC funds or receives
non-LSC funds and meets the objective integrity and independence criterion.
91 See James Ridgeway, Legal Disservices: Attacked by Congress, the People's Law-
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meeting with local police departments to discuss protocols or procedures,
are prohibited.92 This leaves a large void because "advocacy organizations
like those LSC-funded programs are one of the few sources that have exper-
tise and knowledge and can speak for [poor] people. So it's really silencing
a voice, particularly when it silences people from even commenting on regu-
lations."93 Moreover, providing zealous advocacy for clients sometimes re-
quires challenging laws and regulations. Consequently, because there often
is no clear demarcation between challenging the application of a law or
regulation and challenging the law itself, nor is there an easy way to disen-
tangle the two forms of advocacy, the restrictions have the potential to se-
verely curtail the effectiveness of the legal representation clients receive.94
Likewise, the restrictions prohibiting lobbying have a significant impact
on the type of legislation passed that affects poor people.95 Grantees often
are the few advocates of the poor who understand the intricacies of govern-
ment benefit programs, such as Aid for Families With Dependent Children
and Medicaid.96 "The new lobbying restriction ... would deny legislators
information they need to redraft welfare laws and would deny welfare recip-
ients a voice in shaping their future."'
The restrictions on class action lawsuits and the prohibition against re-
covering statutory attorneys' fees also take away an important advocacy tool
from legal aid attorneys. The class action rule allows one or a few clients,
who represent the interests of a group of similarly situated individuals, to
file a lawsuit on behalf of the class.9" This eliminates the costly and
duplicative effort of filing a separate lawsuit for each individual.99 Class
yers Can't Decide Whether to Play Dead or Fight Back, VILLAGE VOICE (New York),
Aug. 6, 1996, at 20.
See MacLachlan, supra note 9, at Al.
9 Ridgeway, supra note 91, at 21.
See MacLachlan, supra note 9, at Al.
95 See generally Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal Services Attor-
neys: Redefining Professional Norms and Obligations, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39 (1994)
(analyzing the federal regulation of legal service attorneys' lobbying activities).
' See Stycos, supra note 14, at 31.
'n Id.
98 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
99
That change, says William Beardall, litigation director of Texas Rural Legal Ser-
vices, would drastically increase the cost of legal actions on workers' behalf and
clog the courts with identical lawsuits . . . "The class action is the only way you
can ensure that the employer doesn't rip off people year after year and profit from
it." Under the new restriction prohibiting class-action suits, if ten or twenty mem-
bers of a crew of 200 farm workers seek the help of legal services to recover
unpaid wages, says Beardall, "the employer can pay off the ten or twenty people
and still end up ahead." But a class-action lawsuit settled by a court-approved
order, he says, ensures all present and future workers will be paid, or the employ-
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actions have yielded major victories for the poor" because not only are
they cost-effective and efficient, they provide a way for attorneys to hold
businesses and government agencies accountable in cases in which wide-
spread injustice has occurred.' Class actions are particularly important in
cases involving migrant farm workers"°u and recipients of government ben-
efits."°3 Likewise, the recovery of attorneys' fees provides attorneys with
an important bargaining chip and serves as a deterrent against the filing of
frivolous lawsuits against poor people."°4
The restrictions prohibiting legal aid attorneys from representing ille-
gal-and many legal-aliens will have a particularly significant impact on
undocumented workers who now have nowhere to turn when employers fail
to fulfill their promises to pay certain wages and to provide certain living
conditions. 5 Illegal aliens who encounter domestic violence and abuse
also will be left with few alternatives.1(6
er risks being found in contempt of court.
Stycos, supra note 14, at 30.
"o See Trevison, supra note 12; Ridgeway, supra note 91, at 21.
101 See Stycos, supra note 14, at 30.
102 See Ridgeway, supra note 91, at 21 ("The Legal Services Corporation ... [pro-
vided] for the first time a sure line of defense for migrant workers challenging agribusi-
ness and the Farm Bureaus.").
103 See Stycos, supra note 14, at 30.
In 1989, for example, Rhode Island Legal Services sued the State Department of
Human Services for failing to give a portion of child-support payments to welfare
recipients. The successful class-action suit will eventually return $400,000 to
women on welfare in Rhode Island, according to staff attorney Gretchen Bath. In
Vermont, legal services filed a class-action suit to speed processing of welfare-
benefit applications; in Cleveland, to integrate and renovate public housing; and in
Louisiana, to force implementation of the "motor-voter" law designed by Con-
gress to encourage people to register to vote.
Id.
104 See Ridgeway, supra note 91, at 21.
o See id.
106 See William Claiborne, Abused Immigrant Slain After Plea for Legal Services
Help Is Denied; New Law Limits Federal Program to Lawful Permanent Residents,
WASH. POST, June 5, 1996, at A3; Dori Meinert, Slaying of Woman Underscores Tight-
er Legal-Aid Restrictions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 21, 1996, at A18. These arti-
cles report the case of Mariella Batista, a Cuban immigrant who was shot to death by
her son's estranged father. Ms. Batista had sought help from a federally funded legal
services organization to get a protective court order against the man, but she was reject-
ed because Congress had adopted, twelve days earlier, the new restrictions prohibiting
assistance to anyone who is not a lawful permanent resident, even if private, non-LSC
funds are used. But see Patrick J. Manshardt, LSC Backers Real Ones to Blame, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 2, 1996, at A16 (suggesting that LSC advocates are exploiting the death of
Ms. Batista and that the real cause of the tragedy was not the new restrictions on grant-
ees, but the failure of a pro-bono attorney to arrive on time).
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Congress's extension of the restrictions to non-LSC funding is a tremen-
dous blow to grantees because it prevents recipients of LSC funds from
engaging in any restricted activity, regardless of whether they use LSC or
non-LSC funds for the activity."° In essence, Congress has restricted the
grantees' activities-whether or not funded by the government-rather than
restricting the grantees' use of federal funds. Moreover, because Congress
allows grantees to transfer non-LSC funds only to recipients who maintain
objective integrity and independence from the grantees (including separate
facilities and personnel), for all practical purposes grantees are unable to set
up separate entities to engage in restricted activities."8 Consequently, the
new restrictions, coupled with the existing restrictions, very seriously impact
grantees and their clients, as Congress undoubtedly intended.
C. A Look at the Ideological Debate Over Federally Funded Legal Services
Whether one views the restrictions as a positive or negative step in re-
forming the way legal services are delivered to the poor depends in large
part on one's ideological underpinnings. Conservatives, who long have criti-
cized the LSC and the use of LSC funds by grantees, believe the restrictions
are a necessary step in reforming federally funded legal aid to the poor.
They maintain that the "restrictions are necessary to keep legal services
focused on the day-to-day legal needs of the poor--fighting unfair evictions,
appealing denial of welfare benefits, and handling child-custody cases."'1"
Conservatives argue that legal aid attorneys have misused federal funds
by pursuing their own "radical agenda" and by "engaging in dubious liti-
gation that is of no real benefit to poor people.' 10 United States Represen-
tative Charles H. Taylor once remarked, "Of the 1.6 million legal matters
[legal service organizations] say they handled [in 1995], at our request, they
In an apparent response to the Batista case, Congress enacted in the 1997 OCRAA
an exception to the prohibition against grantees representing aliens that allows represen-
tation for cases involving aliens or their children who have been subject to domestic
violence. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 502(a)(2)(C), 110 Stat. 3009, 3059. The proposed 1998 appropriations rider continues
this exception. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-405, at H10828, reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2440, 2510-12.
107 See Anna Cekola, Legal Aid Society Hails Ruling Easing Restrictions on Spending
Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at B1; Kathryn Ericson, Limits on Legal Services
Corporation Challenged in Federal Court, WEST'S LEGAL NEwS, Jan. 13, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 8482;
108 Establishing a separate entity that uses different facilities and personnel simply
would be cost prohibitive under the existing budgets that most grantees work within.
109 Stycos, supra note 14, at 30.
110 Hearings, supra note 12, at 130 (testimony of Rep. Dan Burton); see also Cekola,
supra note 107.
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could not find one case where they helped throw a drug dealer out of public
housing or helped protect a home schooler."'' . Conservatives' basic belief
is that
in practice the LSC has routinely diverted taxpayer funds
from legitimate litigation to promoting radical political ob-
jectives that are often irrelevant or detrimental to the poor. In
short, the poor have been used as pawns by Legal Services
lawyers to procure taxpayer funding of their personal politi-
cal agendas. These agendas call for radically interventionist
governmental policies, many of which have been shown to
unequivocally make the poor worse off.'12
Those opposed to the new restrictions, however, believe the restrictions
undermine the legal representation grantees provide low-income clients." 3
They believe the restrictions are a misguided attempt to "protest a handful
of ideologically charged cases."".4 Grantees, they argue, already spend the
vast majority of their time on day-to-day matters that are important to poor
people."5 Rather than improving the services grantees provide, "[t]he leg-
islation weakens the ability of poor people to stand up for their legal rights
and to have an impact, when it may be their only effective method to peti-
tion the government for redress of grievances.""' 6  Furthermore, many
who are critical of the restrictions believe that conservative members of
Congress are trying to silence those opposed to their new policies towards
the poor and are protecting certain constituents."7 "[T]he new restrictions,"
according to legal aid advocates, "would simply ensure that poor people
cannot effectively sue the government, the rich, and the influential. Those
who would lose the most, they say, are America's least powerful resi-
dents-migrant farm workers, battered women, low-wage factory workers,
welfare recipients, and disabled people .... 118
Therefore, the new restrictions and their effects should be understood as
part of an ongoing debate over whether the government should provide
funding for legal services, and if so, for which activities. From the start of
"' Booth, supra note 8.
112 Bennet & Dilorenzo, supra note 12, at 113.
113 See Booth, supra note 8.
114 Id.
11s See id; see also Gail Gibson, For Legal Aid Lawyers, A Quieter Voice, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 1997, at A25.
116 Varshavsky v. Geller, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996), reprinted in
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 22 (col. 2).
117 See Stycos, supra note 14, at 29.
118 Id.
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the LSC, the debate has been ideologically driven. To the extent that the
Republican-led Congress was able to enact these restrictions, the Republican
view appears to have carried the day; however, one of the most difficult
questions remains: Are these restrictions constitutional?
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The new restrictions on legal services raise not only ideological ques-
tions regarding the role of a federally funded legal service program, but also
important and difficult constitutional questions."9 Simply put, to what ex-
tent can Congress, in exchange for federal funds, require LSC grantees and
clients to forego rights that otherwise would be constitutionally protect-
ed? 20 Part II examines the constitutional framework within which this
question needs to be addressed and reviews two doctrinal approaches: the
right-privilege distinction and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Part
II concludes with a review of relevant Supreme Court case law. Part III
applies the constitutional analysis to determine whether the new LSC restric-
tions are constitutional.
Discerning a coherent analytical model for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of congressional restrictions attached to funding grants has become more
difficult as the size and scope of government has increased.' Further
119 See Recent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1346 (1997). The constitutionality of
the restrictions is not only important to the attorneys and clients who receive funding
grants from the LSC, but to our society as a whole as an increasing number of citizens
become economically and socially dependent on their affiliation with the government.
See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1103, 1103-06 (1987). Furthermore, as the trend to decentralize government
services to nongovernmental entities picks up momentum through such mechanisms as
federal block grants, the restrictions Congress may constitutionally place on these grants
become increasingly important. See e.g., id. at 1142-60; Terry Carter, Mum's the Law:
Lawyers Protest Statute Gagging Medicaid Advice, 84 A.B.A. J. Jan. 1998, at 20;
Romesh Ratnesar, Mock Trial, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 16; Richard C. Reuben,
The Welfare Challenge, 83 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 34.
120 See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 7:1
(1996); Rosenthal, supra note 119, at 1103-06, 1120. "The general question is whether
the power of government-federal, state, or local-to deny a privilege includes the
power to grant it on any terms, including the surrender of an otherwise applicable con-
stitutional right." Id. at 1120.
121 See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 120, § 7:1 ("Devising intelligent constitutional princi-
ples to govern this sort of indirect restriction on freedom of speech is one of the most
challenging problems facing any society committed to openness and free expression.");
Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and The Limits of Con-
sent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7-14 (1988); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Govern-
ment Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 544 (1996); Rosenthal,
supra note 119, at 1103-1; Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions
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complicating matters is the fact that the analysis may vary depending on the
setting and the particular rights involved.' Although many constitutional
scholars have proposed new analytical models, 2 ' the United States Su-
preme Court has relied on two competing doctrines in reviewing the consti-
tutionality of restrictions placed on government-financed programs: the
right-privilege distinction and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions."
A. The Right-Privilege Distinction
The right-privilege distinction is a doctrine based on a simple under-
standing of the difference between the rights the Constitution guarantees to
citizens and the privileges the government offers to citizens on a voluntary
basis."2 The government is not entitled to restrict an individual's rights
and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989 (1995).
"2 See Julie A. Nice, Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching Them to Wel-
fare: The Dangers of Selective Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 971 (1995). Government places conditions on receiving
certain benefits in a multitude of contexts. For example, the government may place con-
ditions on charitable or religious organizations that receive federal funding or tax ex-
emptions, see Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); may place
conditions on land use in exchange for zoning rights or permits, see Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825
(1987); or may attach conditions to the recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children benefits, see Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The government, however, may not attach conditions to
the receipt of unemployment benefits, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); to
the use of public school facilities by religious groups, see Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); or to government employment,
see Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The government also may impose
content-neutral restrictions on the use of public forums, see Ward v. Rock Against Rac-
ism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
The resolution of the question potentially impacts any setting in which the government
confers a benefit on an individual or entity. The Court's application of different stan-
dards to different contexts obviously complicates the analysis.
123 See e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Bargaining for Public Assistance, 72 DENV. U. L. REV.
949 (1995); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neu-
trality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Robert C. Post,
Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996); Redish & Kessler, supra note 121;
Rosenthal, supra note 119; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
124 See Post, supra note 123, at 152.
125 See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892) (upholding
the firing of a police officer for certain political speech, on the basis that the govern-
ment could constitutionally place conditions on employment); see also 1 SMOLLA, supra
note 120, § 7:3; Redish & Kesler, supra note 121, at 549; Rodney A. Smolla, The Re-
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unless its justification and methods for doing so pass the proper constitu-
tional standards of review (rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict
scrutiny). Privileges, however, are viewed more as public charity in that
they are not guaranteed by the Constitution, but rather, are a product of the
political process's allocation of public resources. 26 Thus, "[tihe govern-
ment ... could grant citizens privileges on the condition that they surrender
or curtail the exercise of constitutional freedoms that they would otherwise
enjoy. ' 127
Under a right-privilege analysis, the government may place conditions
on government benefits that otherwise would be unconstitutional because no
rights are violated, only privileges."2 Such a conclusion derives its support
from two premises. "First, by definition, a government subsidy is a matter
of governmental largesse, and the greater governmental power to deny the
subsidy logically includes the lesser power to grant the subsidy conditionally
on the waiver of a constitutional right."' 29 Second, one could argue that
the government violates individuals' constitutional rights by offering subsi-
emergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction In Constitutional Law: The Price of Pro-
testing Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71-75 (1982).
126 See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 120, § 7:3, at 7-5. ("In private transactions, the home-
spun wisdom is that 'beggars can't be choosers' and 'gift horses are not to be looked in
the mouth'; the giver may attach what conditions he pleases to the gift.").
127 Id. The right-privilege distinction often was viewed in contractual terms. Rights
were vested interests held independent of the state, while privileges were contractual
relationships between the government and its citizens. As partial consideration for the
privilege, citizens voluntarily gave up rights they otherwise enjoyed. See McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
In McAuliffe, a police officer was fired for talking about politics while on duty. In
upholding the firing as constitutional, Oliver Wendell Holmes, then serving as a justice
on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, articulated the right-privilege distinc-
tion as a matter of simple contractual waiver in which the police officer took "the em-
ployment on the terms which [were] offered him." Id. at 518. According to Justice
Holmes, "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." Id. at 517; see also Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that a Kansas statute
that required out-of-state businesses to pay a charter fee to the state treasurer before
entering into business in Kansas did not violate the Constitution), Commonwealth v.
Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), affd sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897)
(upholding a city ordinance that prohibited public speaking in a municipal park without
a permit from the mayor);
128 See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 120, § 7:3.
129 Redish & Kessler, supra note 121, at 549. The flaw with this argument is best
described by referencing the equal protection context in which the government's power
to withhold a benefit does not include the power to withhold it from a certain racial
group. Likewise, in the free speech context, the right to prohibit unprotected speech,
such as fighting words, does not include the power to prohibit only certain viewpoints
expressed with fighting words. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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dies with conditions, but individuals are free to choose whether to accept
such subsidies, and the individuals are in no worse a position than if the
government had offered no subsidies in the first place. 3 '
B. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
Modern courts and scholars have rejected the overly simplistic and de-
ceptive logic of the right-privilege distinction as unworkable.' In Perry v.
Sindermann,'32 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the right-privilege
distinction and adopted the modern notion of unconstitutional conditions.
Justice Potter Stewart stated:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable govern-
mental benefit and even though the government may deny
him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his con-
stitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in
freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a bene-
fit to a person because of his constitutionally protected
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would
in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to "produce a result which [it] could not com-
mand directly." Such interference with constitutional rights is
impermissible.'33
The Court, however, did not adopt an absolute prohibition against attaching
conditions to government benefits."3 Rather, it recognized that under cer-
tain circumstances the government can grant benefits to individuals and
attach conditions that restrict the constitutional rights of the recipient. There-
130 See Redish & Kessler, supra note 121, at 549.
131 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-38
(1995); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); 1 SMOLLA, supra note 120,
§§ 7:5-7:7; William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). But see Smolla, supra note 125, at
69-71.
132 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
133 Id. at 597 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
134 See Rosenthal, supra note 119, at 1121-22; 1 SMOLLA, supra note 120, § 7:15.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not adopt the same constitutional analysis
in settings when the government is not the employer or financier. In that context, a
"sometimes doctrine" of unconstitutional conditions exists. Id. at 7:24.
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fore, rather than apply an absolute prohibition, courts look to the special
settings and circumstances in which the government and individuals interact,
as well as the nature of the conditions and benefits involved.'35 Ideally, the
doctrine sets out a set of principles that recognizes the government's right to
participate in the political marketplace"3 while providing the necessary
constitutional safeguards for individuals who receive government benefits. In
practice, however, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is difficult and
messy to apply.'37
C. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions When Government Is
Financier
This Section describes the principles for applying the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine when the government provides funding with strings
attached. It also reviews the importance of the threshold determination re-
garding the characterization of the relationship between the funding recipient
and the government and concludes by reviewing four relevant Supreme
Court cases.
Analyzing the constitutionality of the restrictions placed on recipients of
government funds is particularly difficult because
[i]t renders uncertain the status of speakers, forcing us to
determine whether speakers should be characterized as inde-
pendent participants in the formation of public opinion or
instead as instrumentalities of the government. And it renders
uncertain the status of government action, forcing us to de-
termine whether subsidies should be characterized as govern-
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831-34; Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997) (overturning a statute that required appli-
cants for National Endowment for the Arts funding to apply "general standards of de-
cency and respect" to their work); see also Sullivan, supra note 123, at 1421-22. Pro-
fessor Sullivan argued that "[u]nconstitutional conditions problems arise when govern-
ment offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a
preferred constitutional right normally protects from government interference." Id. But
see Post, supra note 123, at 152-53 (arguing that the Court has failed to consider ade-
quately the social implications of First Amendment law).
136 See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 120 §§ 19:8-19:14 (1996).
'" See Post, supra note 123, at 152 ("It is no wonder that the haphazard inconsisten-
cy of the Court's decisions dealing with subsidized speech has long been notorious; the
precedents have rightly been deemed 'confused' and 'incoherent, a medley of misplaced
epigrams"') (citation omitted); Rosenthal, supra note 119, at 1121-22; Sullivan, supra
note 123, at 1416-17; Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
is an Anachronism, 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 620 (1990).
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ment regulations imposed on persons or instead as a form of
government participation in the marketplace of ideas.'38
Therefore, the initial inquiry must be into how to characterize the relation-
ship between the government and the recipient of federal funds upon whom
the restrictions are placed."' Understanding the nature of the relationship
is critical because "substantive First Amendment analysis will depend on
whether the citizen who speaks is characterized as a public functionary or as
an independent participant in public discourse."'40
When the government provides funding to independent actors, the un-
constitutional conditions analysis is similar to the analysis that is applied
when no government benefits are involved;'4' however, when the govern-
ment funds individuals to serve as government agents, the unconstitutional
conditions analysis is more deferential to the government because the state
is considered a participant 4 1 in the public discourse and, therefore, has the
ability to organize its resources in such a way to achieve its goals.'43 To
* the extent that individuals act as government agents in achieving these
goals, the Court views them as instruments of the state rather than as auton-
omous actors. 144
138 Post, supra note 123, at 152.
131 See id.
14 Id. at 155; see Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831-38; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
192-93 (1991) (characterizing federally funded family planning clinics as government
programs and holding that the government could constitutionally prohibit clinics from
advocating abortion as a method of family planning); FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 370, 384-86 (1984) (finding a public broadcaster to be a nonprofit corpo-
ration and holding the prohibition against "editorializing" on federally funded public
broadcasting stations to be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment).
141 See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S.
Ct. 554 (1997). In terms of free speech, the fundamental principle that unimpeded pub-
lic discourse is vital to democratic self-governance, requires zealous protection of the
rights of independent actors within the domain of public discourse. See Rust, 500 U.S.
at 200; Post, supra note 123, at 153-54.
142 Although the Constitution does not prohibit the government from participating in
the political marketplace of ideas (that is, there is no "political establishment" clause),
scholars have raised legitimate concerns that the government has an unfair advantage
and may indoctrinate individuals to its point of view. See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 120,
§§ 19:1-19:4; MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 15, 156 (1983). Some argue
that these dangers require that certain limitations be imposed on government speech.
See YUDOF, supra, at 166-70; Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied
Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Steven Shiffrin, Govern-
ment Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
143 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831-34.
14 See id.; see also Post, supra note 123, at 154. In Rosenberger, the Court noted in
the context of a public university that
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The mere fact of government subsidization, however, does not automati-
cally mean the relationship is characterized as an agency relationship rather
than an independent relationship.145 Such an approach would be a return to
the Holmes right-privilege distinction, which the Court clearly has rejected,
at least in theory, if not consistently in practice. Rather, the characterization
of the government-recipient relationship should be based on the
normative and ascriptive judgments as to whether particular
speakers in particular contexts should constitutionally be
regarded as autonomous participants in the ongoing process
of democratic self-governance. Whether explicitly addressed
or not, such judgments are essential predicates to all cases of
subsidized speech.'46
Once one determines the nature of the government-recipient relationship,
the proper constitutional analysis can be applied. The analysis follows a set
of guiding principles developed through prior case law." 7 The principles
of neutrality, 4 ' precision, "'and proportionality 5 ' are particularly rele-
vant for evaluating the constitutionality of the restrictions Congress placed
on LSC grantees.
The neutrality principle prohibits the government from discriminating
against speech based on the content of what is said or done.' Thus, "the
[w]hen the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the
University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the con-
tent of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private
entities to convey its own message .... When the government disburses public
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate
and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by
the grantee.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
'4 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831-34. The public forum cases provide the best
example of how a person can receive government benefits and still be an independent
actor. See Hague v. Committee for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (holding that
individuals have the right to use public streets and parks to communicate their views).
Some examples include the independent nature of publications, notwithstanding that
they receive second-class mail subsidies, see Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146
(1946), and the independent nature of a privately operated school whose income is de-
rived primarily from public sources, see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840
(1982).
146 Post, supra note 123, at 163.
"' See generally SMOLLA, supra note 15, at 183-208 (identifying and discussing the
principles of neutrality, proportionality, professionalism, accommodation, and licensing).
148 See id. at 183-85.
4 See id. at 51-53.
Iso See id. at 185-89.
5 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that a Texas statute that
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government offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial burdens
on certain speakers based on the content of their expression." 2 Within the
public domain, the government must justify content-based regulations on
autonomous individuals under the most exacting standards.' When the
government finances private actors to participate in the public domain, how-
ever, it, by necessity, creates a limited-purpose public forum.'54 While the
government retains control of the boundaries of the forum, it does not con-
trol the independent actors participating in the forum. Accordingly, within a
limited forum, content-based discrimination that excludes a class of speech
is legitimate only if it preserves the purposes of the limited forum.'55
prohibited flag desecration to preserve the flag's symbol of national unity was inconsis-
tent with person's First Amendment right to free expression); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974) (holding that a Washington statute that prohibited superimposing
extraneous material on the American flag violated a student's First Amendment right to
free expression; Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that a
school violated a student's First Amendment right to protest the Vietnam war by ban-
ning the wearing of black armbands).
152 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
153 See id. Content-neutral regulations, however, are afforded an intermediate standard
of review. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-96 (1989) (holding as
constitutional "time, place and manner" restrictions related to the use of an outdoor
stadium); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying a lower
standard to content- neutral regulations that impact speech).
"' Public-forum doctrine sets forth substantive constitutional analysis related to the
use of government property. See generally 1 SMOLLA, supra note 120, §§ 8:1-6. The
Court has applied public-forum doctrine not only to government-created forums involv-
ing government "property," but also to broader forums that facilitate certain conduct
and activities. Thus, the Court recognized a limited public forum in government-created
access to solicit contributions from government employees, see Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), in the use of a public school's
inter-district mail system, see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37 (1983), and in funding for student activities, see Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
The principles relating to a limited public forum are applicable when the forum is creat-
ed by government funding, see Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827-31, although in such a
case the "forum [is] more in a metaphysical than a spatial or geographic sense." id. at
829. "The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for
which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the
discussion of certain topics." Id. at 829. (citations omitted). However, "[o]nce [the
State] has opened a limited forum ... the State must respect the lawful boundaries it
has itself set." Id.
155 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-31.
The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes
for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or
for the discussion of certain topics. Once it has opened a limited forum, however,
the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not
exclude speech where its distinction is not "reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum."
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When the government participates in the political marketplace through pri-
vate entities, however, no public forum is created. Therefore, it may freely
engage in content-based regulations of its agents, subject only to the require-
ments that the restrictions are proportional to the government's funding and
are related to the government's message. 5 6 In fact, to effectively commu-
nicate a coherent message, the government must engage, to a certain extent,
in making content-based choices.'57
A more problematic type of restriction is one that engages in viewpoint
discrimination, a subset of content-based restrictions. 5 '
When the government targets not subject matter but particu-
lar views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the
First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimi-
nation is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.
The government must abstain from regulating speech when
the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective
of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.159
Viewpoint discrimination is per se unconstitutional for independent ac-
tors. 6 Likewise, viewpoint discrimination of government-financed private
actors within a limited forum is unconstitutional. T6 Viewpoint discrimina-
tion appears constitutional, however, when applied to private individuals
acting as government agents in the political marketplace.
62
Id. at 829 (citations omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985)). Therefore, "[c]onsideration of a forum's
special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance
of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and
function of the particular forum involved." Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981).
156 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-95 (1991); see also Post, supra note 123,
at 154-55. The proportionality principle is discussed infra text accompanying notes 171-
74.
157 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. "When the government disburses public funds
to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appro-
priate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled not distorted by the grantee."
Id.; see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 ("When the Government appropriates public funds to
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of the program . . ").
15' See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that a city ordinance
could not target certain kinds of unprotected speech).
159 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
16 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
161 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("[V]iewpoint discrimination ... is presumed
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.").
162 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93. To the extent viewpoint discriminatory restrictions
are placed on recipients acting as government agents, the restrictions must be related to
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Related to the neutrality principle is the precision principle, which re-
quires that government restrictions be precise and not overbroad or
vague.'63 Accordingly, funding restrictions that infringe upon "traditional
spheres" of free expression fundamental to the functioning of our society
must be narrowly tailored. "Government's ability to control speech within
th[ese] sphere[s] by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Gov-
ernment funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of
the First Amendment."'" Preliminarily, when government, vis-a-vis its
funding, regulates traditional spheres of free expression, it may do so only
to further a legitimate and substantial purpose.'65 Absent such a purpose,
the regulations by definition are overbroad." Even if the purpose is sub-
stantial, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved"'67
or by means that are ambiguous or vague in their application. 6
Thus, when the government's regulations are susceptible to sweeping
and improper application because of the uncertainty of its proscriptions, they
are unconstitutionally defective on vagueness grounds. "[P]recision of regu-
lation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most pre-
cious freedoms."'69 Similarly, "[w]here statutes have an overbroad sweep,
just as where they are vague, 'the hazard of loss or substantial impairment
of those precious rights may be critical' ..... 'The breadth of legislative
the purpose of the government's message and satisfy the proportionality principle.
163 See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 120, §§ 6:1-6:6.
1- Rust, 500 U.S. at 200; see also Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
165 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967).
166 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (holding regulations that re-
stricted litigation activities of the NAACP overbroad because the State had failed to
advance a substantial government interest for the regulations).
167 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960)).
168 See Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33.
The Fifth Amendment due process clause requires that a statute be sufficient-
ly clearly defined so as not to cause persons "of common intelli-
gence-necessarily [to] guess at its meaning and [to] differ as to its applica-
tion." . . . In the area of expressive conduct, vague laws offend several important
values: (1) they may trap the innocent by failure to provide fair warning; (2) they
may fail to provide explicit and objective standards and therefore permit arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement; and (3) they may inhibit First Amendment free-
doms by forcing individuals to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1471 (C.D. Ca. 1992) (citations omitted), aft'd, 100
F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
169 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 430).
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abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving
the same basic purpose.'
170
The third important principle for evaluating the constitutionality of the
restrictions on LSC grantees is the proportionality principle. 171 Simply put,
to the extent that the government can place conditions on recipients, these
conditions must be in proportion to the government's economic contribu-
tion.17 1 Stated in a slightly different manner, the government must allow
for adequate alternative channels for engaging in restricted speech or activi-
ties using nongovernment funds. 173 When the government attempts to con-
trol the use of resources it did not contribute, it has moved beyond merely
attaching conditions to its own money to regulating the general market-
place.' 74 Thus, "unconstitutional conditions cases involve situations in
which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsi-
dy rather than on the particular program or service, thus, effectively prohib-
iting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope
of the federally funded program.' ' 175 Therefore, while the government may
attach certain conditions to its funding, it is limited in its ability to extend
these conditions to funds it did not contribute.
To summarize, the constitutional analysis applicable to conditions at-
tached to government funding begins with characterizing the grantee within
the grantee-government relationship as either an independent actor or a
government agent. This characterization is a prerequisite for applying the
neutrality, precision, and proportionality principles. While these principles
may appear coherent in theory, the Supreme Court often has applied them in
a confusing and inconsistent manner. Thus, a review of a few of the Court's
key holdings in this area is warranted.
D. The Supreme Court's Application of the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine
This Section reviews four Supreme Court cases that provide insight into
170 Id. at 609 (citations omitted) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
171 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1984); 2 SMOLLA,
supra note 120, §§ 19:11-19:13.
172 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400; 2 SMOLLA, supra note 120
§ 19:13.
See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402, 1414 (D. Haw.
1997).
174 See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 120, § 19:13. "The more lax constitutional treatment
given to the government when it participates in the speech market, however, should not
be extended to the government when it is in fact engaged in market regulation, under
the pretext of mere participation." Id.
175 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991).
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how the constitutional analysis for restrictions attached to funding grants has
been applied: Regan v. Taxation with Representation,176 FCC v. League of
Women Voters,1 7 Rust v. Sullivan, T7 and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of the University of Virginia.'79 Although the Court is still searching
for an intellectually satisfying approach to restrictions attached to govern-
ment funding, the case law establishes that the Court is concerned with gov-
ernment regulations that violate the neutrality, precision, and proportionality
principles.
At issue in Regan was whether § 501(c)(3)) of the Internal Revenue
Code,' which granted tax exemptions to charitable organizations, was
constitutional. Congress limited the exemption to those organizations that
did not attempt to influence legislation and did not participate in political
campaigns. Thus, in exchange for tax relief (a federal subsidy) the charitable
organizations agreed not to engage in lobbying and campaigning-activities
considered to be at the heart of democratic self-governance.
Justice Rehnquist, in a unanimous opinion, held that Congress could
condition the tax exemption in such a way. Rehnquist noted that Congress
merely decided which charitable activities to subsidize through the tax
code.' Furthermore, Under the code, charitable organizations could estab-
lish a tax exempt § 501(c)(4) entity to engage in lobbying on behalf of the
501(c)(3) entity.'82 Thus, Congress's decision of how to allocate scarce re-
sources, even if done by subsidizing some speech ("charitable" speech)
rather than all speech (lobbying and political involvement), did not violate a
fundamental right of the charitable organizations. 3
A year after Regan, the Court decided FCC v. League of Women Vot-
ers."l In a five-to-four decision, the Court struck down a regulation for-
bidding any station that received grants from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (CPB) from engaging in "editorializing." Congress created the
176 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
1 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
179 515 U.S. 819'(1995).
I80 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1996).
... See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46.
182 See id. at 544; id. at 551-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
183 See id. at 545-46. Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that "[t]he case would be
different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as
to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' Id. at 548.
Although Congress had enacted a regulation based on the content of speech (lobby-
ing and political speech), it had not engaged in viewpoint discrimination (for example,
subsidizing only certain lobbying or political speech). It merely subsidized nonprofit
charitable organizations that did not participate in lobbying and politics. See id. at 544.
184 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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CPB through the Public Broadcasting Act of 196715 to disburse federal
funds to noncommercial television and radio stations in support of educa-
tional programming. In essence, the restriction prohibited the management of
a station that received CPB funding from expressing its views on current
issues. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that the regulation
was "specifically directed at a form of speech-namely the expression of
editorial opinion-that lies at the heart of First Amendment protection.' 86
Of particular importance in the holding was Justice Brennan's discussion
distinguishing Regan. The government argued, relying on Regan, that "Con-
gress ha[d], in the proper exercise of its spending power, simply determined
that it 'will not subsidize public broadcasting station editorials.' 187 Justice
Brennan responded that, under Regan, "a charitable organization could cre-
ate.. . an affiliate to conduct its nonlobbying activities using tax-deductible
contributions, and at the same time, establish ... a separate affiliate to
pursue its lobbying efforts without such contributions."'88 Thus, the restric-
tion in the tax code did not impinge upon any protected activity; Congress
simply chose not to subsidize the lobbying and political activities of tax-ex-
empt organizations.
As Justice Brennan explained, League of Women Voters was fundamen-
tally different because
a noncommercial educational station that receives only 1% of
its overall income from CPB grants is barred absolutely from
all editorializing. Therefore, in contrast to the appellee in
Taxation With Representation, such a station is not able to
segregate its activities according to the source of its funding.
The station has no way of limiting the use of its federal
funds to all non-editorializing activities, and, more impor-
tantly, it is barred from using even wholly private funds to
finance its editorial activity.'89
47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1967).
186 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381. The protection of the right to discuss
issues of public importance "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values" because of "'a profound national commitment ... that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' Id. at 381-82 (citations
omitted).
187 Id. at 399 (quoting the Government's brief).
" Id. at 400. Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Regan foreshadowed Justice
Brennan's concern that affiliate organizations be allowed to engage in prohibited activi-
ties. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 551-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
18' League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400. Compare Justice Brennan's reasoning
with Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist argued that the
government was simply exercising its right to allocate public funds and that the condi-
tion imposed need only bear a rational relationship to the government's objectives un-
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Therefore, while Regan established the general proposition that the govern-
ment could attach content-based regulations to subsidies, League of Women
Voters limited such regulations to situations in which the restrictions would
apply only to the government's economic contribution, which would leave
the recipient free to create alternate channels to use nonfederal funds to
engage in the prohibited activities. Thus, in Regan and League of Women
Voters, the Court established and defined the proportionality principle when
government is financier.
In 1991, the Court again had the opportunity to review the principles
underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Rust v. Sullivan.9
Rust involved regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services (HHS) that placed restrictions on recipients of family planning
funds pursuant to Title X of the Public Health Service Act."' These regu-
lations prohibited recipients from engaging in abortion-related counseling or
promoting abortion as a method of family planning, and required Title X
projects to maintain objective integrity and independence from affiliate orga-
nizations who engaged in prohibited activities.'92 The Title X regulations
were challenged by grantees and doctors who argued, inter alia, that the
restrictions "impermissibly impos[ed] 'viewpoint-discriminatory conditions
on government subsidies.
' '' 93
In a five-to-four decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the ma-
jority in Rust, upheld the regulations as constitutional.' 94 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's rationale was similar to that used in Regan: "[T]he Government
has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to
less the conditions are aimed at suppressing dangerous ideas. See id. at 405-08
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
' Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (1970)). The Court noted that the statute was
ambiguous as to whether recipients of Title X funds could engage in abortion counsel-
ing, referral, or advocacy. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 184. Accordingly, the Court gave great
deference to the Secretary's interpretation and corresponding regulations. See id.
" The challenged regulations prohibited a Title X project from "provid[ing] counsel-
ing concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning," 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.8(a)(1) (1989), or from engaging in activities that "encourage, promote or advocate
abortion as a method of family planning," id. § 59.10(a). The regulations further re-
quired that Title X Projects be organized so that they were "physically and financially
separate" from prohibited abortion activities. Id. § 59.9. See also Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-
80.
193 Rust, 500 U.S. at 192 (quoting Brief for Petitioners).
' Interestingly, Justice Brennan had been replaced by Justice Souter. Justice Souter
provided the necessary vote for Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority, as Justice Brennan
undoubtedly would have found the restriction unconstitutional. See 2 SMOLLA, supra
note 120, § 19:14.
19981
858 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 6:3
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."'95 According to the Chief
Justice, "[t]his is not a case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous
idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engag-
ing in activities outside of the project's scope.', 19 6 Rehnquist clearly
viewed the Title X project recipients as government agents conveying the
government's message that abortion was not an acceptable form of family
planning.9 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that in certain "spher[es] of free
expression,"'98 "funding by the Government, even when coupled with the
freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Govern-
ment-funded project, is [not] invariably sufficient to justify Government
control over the content of expression."'99 The Chief Justice noted that the
traditional doctor-patient relationship may be such a sphere deserving
heightened constitutional protection, but concluded that the Title X regula-
tions did "not significantly impinge upon" the relationship to warrant such
protection.2 "° Thus, while acknowledging the importance of the precision
principle in the funding context, Rehnquist determined it was not applicable
to the facts in Rust.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also upheld the HHS regulations that imposed
stringent conditions on the ability of doctors receiving Title X funding to
perform abortion counseling using non-Title X funds.2"' Unlike the simple
requirement for establishing an affiliate in Regan, which only required creat-
ing a separate legal entity and maintaining separate books,2" the HHS reg-
ulations went significantly further by requiring that an affiliate maintain "ob-
jective integrity and independence" from the Title X project.2"3 Maintain-
ing objective integrity and independence required, inter alia, that the HHS
Secretary consider on a case-by-case basis whether separate personnel exist-
ed and the degree of physical separation of the project from facilities for
prohibited activities.2" According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Title X
grantees were government agents communicating government messages. As
such, more restrictive regulations were permitted because HHS had the right
to "avoid creating the appearance that the Government is supporting abor-
tion-related activities."2 5
195 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
'9 Id. at 194.
197 See id. at 193-95.
198 Id. at 200.
I" Id. at 199.
200 Id. at 200.
20, See id. at 1.96-99.
212 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 & n. 6 (1983).
23 Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
214 See id. at 187-88.
205 Id. at 188.
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Notably, Regan involved government funding of independent actors. In
that case the government was limited to only those regulations on affiliate
organizations that would provide adequate accounting and traceability of the
federal funding as a means to ensure it was not used in the affiliate organi-
zation.' Thus, Rust acknowledged the proportionality principle estab-
lished in Regan and League of Women Voters, but further defined its appli-
cation by allowing greater restrictions on affiliate organizations when the
funding involves government actors, as compared to independent actors.
While further analysis of Rust is outside the scope of this Note, it suffic-
es to say that Rust represents a marked conservative shift in the Court's
unconstitutional conditions doctrine-a shift that looks amazingly similar to
the old right-privilege distinction. 7
The Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia,208 however, reaffirmed its commitment that funding restrictions that
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint are unconstitutional at least when
applied to funding recipients who remain independent actors in the political
marketplace. At issue in Rosenberger was the constitutionality of the Uni-
versity of Virginia's student publication funding policy that funded only
groups that, among other things, did not engage in religious activities.2'
206 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 543-45. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Court would have
upheld the Rust regulations relating to the establishment of affiliate organizations had
the regulations been imposed on the nonprofit recipients of federal funding at issue in
Regan. See id. at 552-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (opining that any significant re-
strictions on the alternative channel of communication beyond simply requiring it to be
a separate legal entity and to maintain separate books "would extend far beyond
Congress' mere refusal to subsidize lobbying ... [and] would render the statutory
scheme unconstitutional.").
"' Scholars have severely criticized the holding in Rust based on Chief Justice
Rehnquist's narrow definition of viewpoint discrimination and his dismissal of the
recipient's argument that the regulations violated the protected doctor-patient relation-
ship. See Cole, supra note 123, at 683-84; Post, supra note 123, at 168-77; Redish &
Kessler, supra note 121, at 573-77; 2 SMOLLA, supra note 120, § 19:14; see also Phillip
J. Cooper, Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision and the Supreme Court's Free Flow Theory
of the First Amendment, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 359 (1992); Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Brind & Rust v. Sullivan: Free Speech and the Limits of a Written
Constitution, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1994); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan
and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1993); Peter M. Shane,
The Rust That Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech, and Responsibility, 52 LA. L. REV.
1585 (1992); Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1724 (1995); Michael Fitzpatrick, Note, Rust Corrodes: The First Amendment Implica-
tions of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REV. 185 (1992). But see William W. Van
Alstyne, Second Thoughts on Rust v. Sullivan and the First Amendment, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 5 (1992).
208 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
209 See id. at 825. The policy defined religious activity as any activity that "primarily
19981 859
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
The University denied funding to a student organization called Wide Awake
Productions because it was a publication organized to promote Christian
viewpoints. The University funded other religious groups as long'as they did
not engage in religious editorializing.
The Court held, in a five-to-four decision, that the restrictions amounted
to viewpoint discrimination because the "prohibited perspective, not the
general subject matter," was regulated.2"' In strong language, the Court re-
affirmed that "[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particu-
lar views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amend-
ment is all the more blatant. '.. Moreover, the Court explained, "[t]he
government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers
on the economic fact of scarcity." '
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, distinguished Rust from
Rosenberger in that Rust involved the "government disburs[ing] public
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message," '213 while in
Rosenberger the University was not speaking through the organizations, but
used funding to "encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. 2 4
Thus, Justice Kennedy recognized that for constitutional analysis there is a
key, if not controlling, distinction between subsidies to independent actors
and subsidies to individuals who function as government agents. 5 There-
fore, "[a] holding that the University may not discriminate based on the
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the
University's own speech, which is controlled by different principles."2"'
Rosenberger, when compared to Rust, underscores the critical nature of the
initial characterization of the government-recipient relationship.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE
RECIPIENTS OF LSC FUNDS
In this Part, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine2"7 is applied to the
restrictions Congress placed on recipients of LSC funding. This Section
begins by reviewing the existing challenges to the new legislation and then
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." Id.
210 Id. at 831.
211 Id. at 829.
212 Id. at 835.
213 Id. at 833.
214 Id. at 834.
211 See id. at 833. Justice Kennedy stated that in Rust, "[wie recognized that when
the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is
entitled to say what it wishes." Id.
216 Id. at 834.
217 For a discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see supra Part 11.
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proceeds to analyze the constitutionality of the new legislation and accompa-
nying rules.
A. A Review of Existing Challenges to the Restrictions
Legal aid organizations that receive LSC funding have been divided
over whether to challenge the regulations. On the one hand, some grantees
believe that challenging the regulations will simply give Congress a reason
to eliminate funding altogether.218 According to this reasoning, it is better
to live with the restrictions because they affect so few cases than risk losing
funding altogether. Others, however, believe that the restrictions go too far
and should be challenged if legal aid organizations are to retain any type of
independence and integrity in serving ciients.219 The constitutionality of
the restrictions are being challenged in three cases, which are reviewed in
this Section.22
On December 24, 1996, a New York State judge ruled in Varshavsky v.
Geller 1 on the constitutionality of the LSC regulations that require legal
aid attorneys to withdraw from class action lawsuits. At issue in Varshavsky
was whether Valerie Bogart, a staff attorney with Legal Services for the
Elderly (LSE) (a subsidiary office of Legal Services of New York City
(LSNY)), was required to withdraw as class counsel pursuant to the 1996
OCRAA restrictions and accompanying LSC regulations.nm LSE received
one-third of its funding from LSC sources and two-thirds from non-LSC
218 See Jan Hoffman, Counseling the Poor, But Now One by One, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1996, at 47; Ridgeway, supra note 91, at 21; David E. Rovella, Legal Aid Lawyers
Roll Dice With New Lawsuit: LSC Officials Fear Angry Congressional Reaction, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 10, 1997, at A6; Recent Legislation, supra note 119, at 1351.
219 See Rovella, supra note 218.
LSC restrictions previously have been challenged unsuccessfully. See, e.g., Texas
Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 783 F. Supp. 1426 (D.D.C. 1992) (uphold-
ing a LSC rule prohibiting funding or redistricting lawsuits).
"' Varshavsky v. Geller, No. 40767/91, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996), reprinted in
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 22 (col. 2); see also Daniel Wise, Class Action Ban for
Poor Struck: Legal Services Rule Held Unconstitutional, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1996, at 1;
New York Judge: Laws Barring Legal Services from Class Actions Unconstitutional,
WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, (Jan. 6, 1997,) at 14,048, available in 1997 WL 2053; Don Van
Natta, Jr., Lawyers for Poor Applaud Lifting of Class Action Ban, AUSTIN AM. STATES-
MAN, Jan. 1, 1997, at A27.
222 The class-action lawsuit was commenced in 1991 and challenged the New York
State Department of Social Services' abolition of its In-Home Administrative Hearing
Program. In 1992, a preliminary injunction was issued which later was affirmed on
appeal that prohibited Social Services from terminating benefits without an initial tele-
phone interview and, if necessary, an in-home hearing. See Varshavsky v. Pearles, 202
A.2d 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Ms. Bogart had served as class counsel from its in-
ception.
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sources. Pursuant to the new rules, Ms. Bogart was required to withdraw as
class counsel in August, 1996, and the LSC had threatened to withdraw all
of LSNY's funding if she did not withdraw. Ms. Bogart requested that the
court decide whether her withdrawal was permissible under the New York
State Code of Professional Responsibility and whether the 1996 OCRAA
and LSC rules were unenforceable because they violated the Constitu-
tion."
The court preliminarily held that withdrawal as class counsel would not
violate Ms. Bogart's professional responsibility obligations because it would
not result in a "material adverse affect [sic] on the interests of the cli-
ent."2" After noting that the LSC Act prohibited the LSC from promulgat-
ing any rules that interfered with attorneys' professional responsibilities,'
the court noted that co-counsel, who was employed by a non-LSC funded
organization, was able to take over the case without an adverse impact.
Thus, the court was required to address the constitutionality of applying the
restrictions to non-LSC funds.
In proceeding with its constitutional analysis, the court first determined
that a constitutional right was implicated by the ban on class action law-
suits." Citing NAACP v. Button,227 United Mine Workers v. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n, and United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Mich-
igan,"' the court stated that the case at bar implicated the "fundamental
First Amendment right to engage in collective litigation to achieve political
objectives." '23 While giving a scathing rebuke to Congress regarding the
new restrictions," the court concluded it did not need to decide the issue
See Varshavsky, No. 40767/91, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 22 (col.
2).
' Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(c)
(1996)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2966e(b)(3) (1994).
26 See Varshavsky, No. 40767/91, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 22 (col.
2).
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
228 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
401 U.S. 576 (1971).
230 Varshavsky, No. 40767/91, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 22 (col. 2).
z' See id. The court stated:
Here there is no justification for the ban on the use of non-federal funds for class
action litigation, compelling, substantial, or rational. The ostensible goal of saving
money will not be accomplished by relegating the poor to less efficient individual
actions for the same relief.
The legislative history of the restriction on class action litigation challenged
here reveals that the actual state interest in passing the legislation was a blatant
attempt to inhibit the First Amendment rights of LSC lawyers, their clients and
anyone who agrees with them. The restrictions were designed to minimize, if not
prevent, the political impact of the causes of the poor and their champions.
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of whether the withdrawal of federal funding alone would violate the Con-
stitution, because the LSC regulations extending the restrictions to non-LSC
funds clearly were unconstitutional.232 Relying primarily on Regan v. Tax-
ation with Representation33 and FCC v. League of Women Voters2" the
court held the LSC Act and Rules unconstitutional, opining that:
The Acts and the Rules threaten our most cherished Ameri-
can First Amendment freedoms: freedom of association,
freedom of speech and freedom to petition the government
for redress of grievances. The rhetoric of budget reform is
being used to thinly disguise an attack on basic freedoms.
The restrictions could effectively bar LSC attorneys, their
clients, their private and State donors, and those to whom
LSC wishes to donate its non-federal funds from exercising
their constitutionally protected right to freedom of associa-
tion. That Congress may not do this has been explicitly stat-
ed in a long line of Supreme Court precedents that derived
from attacks on desegregation and unions. At bottom, the
legislation weakens the ability of poor people to stand up for
their legal rights and to have an impact, when it may be their
only effective method to petition the government for redress
of grievances.23
It is noteworthy that the [SC regulations in place at the time the court re-
viewed Ms. Bogart's motion were those that the LSC promulgated on De-
cember 2, 1996, which completely prohibited the use of non-LSC funds,
even if given away, for restricted activities.236 As previously mentioned,
the LSC substantially revised these regulations on May 21, 1997, in re-
sponse to the Hawaii temporary injunction. 7
In Legal Aid Society v. Legal Services Corp. (Hawaii 1),2" legal aid
organizations that received LSC funding brought an action in federal court
to enjoin the LSC from enforcing the restrictions as applied to non-LSC
Id.
232 See id.
461 U.S. 540 (1982).
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
Varshavsky, No. 40767/91, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 22 (col. 2).
236 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (1996).
17 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
238 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997) [(Hawaii I)]; see also Anna Cekola, LegalAid
Society Hails Ruling Easing Restrictions on Spending Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997,
at B1; Claudia MacLachlan, Hawaii Court Blocks Limits on LSC, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 3,
1997, at A9; Barbara Vobejda, Congressional Curbs on Legal Aid Programs Chal-
lenged in Court, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1997, at A19.
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funds. Similar to the analysis in Varshavsky, the court first identified the
constitutional rights that the 1996 OCRAA and LSC rules implicated.23 9
The court began with the restrictions prohibiting grantees from influencing
and lobbying legislators and administrators and found that they clearly in-
fringed on First Amendment rights."0 Next, citing NAACP v. Button and
its progeny, the court opined that there appeared to be a constitutional "right
of access to the courts" for any reason, but that such a right clearly existed
when it was to."[protect] a litigant's right to vindicate constitutional rights,"
such as the right to an abortion; 4 however, the court did not find that the
initiation of a class action lawsuit was a constitutionally protected right,
contrary to the holding in Varshavsky.242
The court also concluded that the new legislation and rules implicated
the right of association, 3 although the protected right of association did
not extend to aliens because of Congress's plenary power over immigration
issues.244 Finally, the court noted that when
[r]ead together, the freedom of association defined above
coupled with the right of meaningful access to the courts
provides First Amendment protection from government's
intentional interference with the confidential relationship be-
tween lawyers (or legal aid associations) and prospective
clients. 5
The court, however, found that no constitutional rights were implicated
by the restrictions preventing the claiming or collection of attorneys' fees or
the requirement that a written statement of facts be prepared prior to the
initiation of litigation or pre-litigation negotiations. 6
9 See Hawaii I, 961 F. Supp. at 1408-11.
24 See id. at 1408. The court held that the following sections from the 1996 OCRAA
implicated the right to lobby: sections 504(a)(1) through 504(a)(3) and section
504(a)(16).
24 Id. at 1408-09. The court held that only section 504(a)(14), which limited partici-
pation in litigation related to abortion, implicated the right of meaningful access to the
court.
22 See id. at 1410.
23 See id. at 1409. The court held that the prohibition against representing people
allegedly engaged in drug activity in public housing, (section 504(a)(16)), and against
conducting training programs advocating public policies or encouraging political activi-
ty,(section 504(a)(12)), implicated the constitutional right of association and the confi-
dential attorney-client relationship.
2' See Hawaii I, at 1410.
25 Id. at 1409 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513 (11th
Cir. 1992)).
u6 See id. at 1411.
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Determining that constitutional rights were implicated, the court pro-
ceeded to review the constitutionality of the restrictions relating to the estab-
lishment of affiliate organizations that could use non-LSC funds to engage
in the restricted activities. According to the court, the dispositive factor
based on Regan v. Taxation with Representation, FCC v. League of Women
Voters, and Rust v. Sullivan, was "whether the restrictions left open ade-
quate channels for speech." 7 The court viewed these cases as represent-
ing a "continuum of the availability of alternate channels with League on
one end (no alternate channels), TWR [Taxation with Representation] on the
other (alternate channels readily obtainable), and Rust in the middle (alter-
nate channels theoretically obtainable).""24 The court reviewed the LSC
rules regulating whether grantees could establish affiliate organizations to
engage in the restricted activities. The court determined that the restrictions
were more burdensome than those at issue in Rust and most comparable to
the outright prohibition found in League of Women Voters.249 Thus, be-
cause the plaintiffs had a significant likelihood of success in prevailing on
their unconstitutional conditions claim-that irreparable injury would result
and the balance of hardships favored the plaintiffs-the court issued an
injunction."
On May 21, 1997, the LSC promulgated new regulations based on the
court's injunction. On August 1, 1997, the LSC, joined by the Department
of Justice (DOJ), moved for summary judgment in Hawaii II, arguing that
the new regulations satisfied Rust's requirements of establishing a separate
organization for engaging in restricted activities." In response, the plain-
tiff moved for summary judgment, arguing that Rust did not control this
case and that, in any event, the new regulations did not conform to the Rust
standard. 52
First, the court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Rust.53
Significantly, the court rejected the argument that Title X was designed to
communicate a governmental message while the LSC Act was not." Ac-
cording to the court, "Congress does not control the analysis and advice of
either a Title X doctor or a LSC lawyer except for prohibiting advice in
247 Id. at 1414.
248 Id.
29 See id. at 1415-16.
See id. at 1419.
21 Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Haw. 1997) [(Ha-
waii II)].
252 See id. at 1293.
13 The court appeared particularly annoyed that the plaintiffs had "argued rather
vehemently in the motion for a preliminary injunction that Rust applied in this case
[and] [n]ow that the LSC had attempted to comply with the dictates in Rust, however,
the plaintiffs argue that Rust does not apply." Id.
2"' See id. at 1294.
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certain areas such as abortion."" The court also rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the LSC restricts litigation, a traditional sphere of expression,
whereas Rust did not. 56 Although the court did not outright reject this dis-
tinction, it concluded that such restrictions were to be measured by the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment; but because
the plaintiff had not alleged the restrictions were vague or overbroad, they
could not attempt to distinguish Rust on either of those bases."7
Next, the court reviewed the revised regulations and concluded that.
although they still appeared somewhat more restrictive than those at issue in
Rust, they were constitutionally permissible because they allowed for ade-
quate alternate channels. 5 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the practical effects of the regulations foreclosed grantees from establishing
separate organizations to engage in prohibited activities." Further, the
court interpreted the new regulations as allowing grantees to exercise control
over affiliates as long as the "insularity" and legal separation requirements
were met.26 Based on these revised regulations, the court granted the
LSC's and DOJ's motion for summary judgment and dissolved the injunc-
tion.
Finally, a suit was filed on January 14, 1997, in Brooklyn federal court,
not only challenging the restrictions limiting the use of non-LSC funds, but
also directly challenging the restrictions on federal funds.26' On December
22, 1997, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction that sought to enjoin the LSC from implementing its program in-
tegrity requirements from affiliate organizations.262 The court relied heavi-
ly on the decision in Hawaii II, but went on to hold that in implementing
the requirements, Congress had an interest not only in prohibiting the use of
federal funds for certain activities, but also in preventing the appearance of
government endorsement of the prohibited activities.263 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the program integrity requirements were not narrowly tailored for
the government's interest and that they thus suffered from vagueness and
overbreadth problems.2"' The court rejected this argument, finding that the
''program integrity requirements are appropriately tailored to advance the
255 Id.
256 See id.
257 See id.
2 See id. at 1294-95.
259 See id. at 1297.
261 Id. at 1297-98.
261 See Amended Class Action Complaint, Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F.
Supp. 323 (1997) (No. 97-CV-182); see also Rovella, supra note 218.
262 See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (1997).
263 See id. at 338.
264 See id. at 338-39.
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Government's legitimate interest in preventing the appearance of endorse-
ment ... 265
The court also held that the restrictions did not significantly impinge
upon the attorney-client relationship:
While this Court obviously has reverence for the majesty
of the law, the restrictions pertaining to LSC recipients do
not significantly impinge on the lawyer-client relationship,
especially when contrasted with Title X's proactive aspects.
Indeed, they simply proscribe the activities in which LSC
recipients may engage. Moreover, the extent of the activities
which LSC recipients are prohibited from engaging in cannot
enter into the constitutional mix since it is bedrock law that
Congress need not fund the exercise of constitutional rights,
regardless of their magnitude.266
B. A Constitutional Analysis of the New Legislation and Regulations
The following Section applies the previously described unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to the restrictions and regulations placed on grantees.
This Section clarifies that the LSC is a governmental entity, identifies the
constitutional rights implicated, and evaluates the constitutionality of the
restrictions and regulations. The analysis used by the New York and Hawaii
courts previously discussed are used as reference points throughout this
analysis. This Section concludes with a-summary of the analysis.
1. The LSC Is a Governmental Entity for Constitutional Analysis
It is important to note that the LSC is a governmental agency for pur-
poses of constitutional analysis, notwithstanding that Congress created the
LSC as a private, nonprofit corporation. 7 Although the LSC is a govern-
265 Id. at 342.
266 Id. at 343 (citations omitted). After concluding that the new restrictions did not
impinge on the attorney-client relationship, the court thanked the plaintiffs for com-
mencing the litigation because it stood "as a testament to the continued vibrancy and
vitality of the very First Amendment rights at the heart of this lawsuit-access to the
courts, free and open public debate, and freedom to associate for the vindication of
legal rights." Id. This is somewhat of an ironic conclusion in light of the proposed 1998
bill, which would "debar" a recipient from receiving an additional award of financial
assistance from the LSC if the recipient were to file a lawsuit "naming the Corporation,
or any agency or employee of a Federal, State, or local government, as a defendant."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-405, H10828 (1997), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2440,
2510-12.
267 See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402, 1408 (D. Haw.
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mental entity, recipients of LSC funds clearly are not, and, consequently,
legal aid attorneys working for organizations receiving LSC grants would
not be considered government employees for purposes of constitutional
analysis.168 Grantees are independent nonprofit organizations incorporated
within the state in which they provide services.2 69 They have their own
board of directors and operate independently from the LSC, except for the
LSC restrictions that the grantees must follow.27 Legal aid organizations
receive funding from many other non-LSC sources, which further establishes
their independence from the LSC.2 7 Thus the LSC is considered a govern-
1997) (citing Texas Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1991)). The Supreme Court addressed a similar question of how to categorize a
public-private corporation for First Amendment analysis in Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995). In Lebron, the Court noted that Congress creat-
ed the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (commonly known as Amtrak) as a
private corporation, and that Congress declared that it "will not be an agency or estab-
lishment of the United States Government." Id. at 391 (citing Rail Passenger Service
Act of 1970 (RPSA), 84 Stat. 1330). The Court held, however, that "[w]here ... the
Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental
objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the direc-
tors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the
First Amendment." Id. at 400. In fact, in Lebron, the Court specifically noted the simi-
larities between Amtrak and other public-private corporations, such as the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting and the Legal Services Corporation. See id. at 391.
268 The relationships between the LSC and grantees are of an independent nature by
design. Thus, the indicia of employment are not present to conclude that legal aid attor-
neys are government employees. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(e)(2) (1994). This section
states that "[e]mployees of the Corporation and staff attorneys shall be deemed to be
State or local employees for purposes of chapter 15 of Title 5, except that no staff attor-
ney may be a candidate in a partisan political election." Id. According to the LSC Act,
"staff attorney"
means an attorney more than one half of whose annual professional income is
derived from the proceeds of a grant from the Legal Services Corporation or is
received from a recipient, subrecipient, grantee, or contractor that limits its activi-
ties to providing legal assistance to clients eligible for assistance under the Act.
42 U.S.C. § 2996a(7) (1996).
Chapter 15 of Title 5, a part of the Hatch Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1996), prohibits
local and state government employees from influencing elections and taking part in
political campaigns.
The definition of "staff attorneys" as including those attorneys who receive more
than half of their salaries from LSC funds, in no way converts a legal aid attorney into
a government employee for constitutional analysis. See Smith v. Ehrlich, 430 F. Supp.
818 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding as constitutional LSC regulations that prohibited staff attor-
neys from seeking election to either partisan or nonpartisan political offices).
26. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
27, See supra text accompanying note 267.
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mental entity for constitutional analysis, but LSC funding recipients and
their employees are not considered part of the government. 2
2. Identifying the Rights
In order for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to apply, there must
be a "constitutional interest at issue [that] rise[s] to the level of a recognized
right-indeed, a preferred right normally protected by strict judicial re-
view. 27' The restrictions Congress placed on LSC grantees impinge on
constitutionally protected rights. As the Hawaii federal district court con-
cluded, the rights implicated include at a minimum those protected by the
First Amendment:274 the right to lobby and influence government, the right
to freedom of association, and the right to access the courts. The Supreme
Court also has recognized the attorney-client relationship as a special sphere
deserving First Amendment protection because it involves highly cherished
expressive and associational conduct.275 Arguably, the restrictions also
raise due process,' equal protection,' and federalism" issues, along
212 Establishing the status of the LSC and attorneys working in legal aid offices is
important because the substantive constitutional analysis applied to government employ-
ees is different from that applied to nongovernment employees working for organiza-
tions receiving federal funding. Compare Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (gov-
ernment employment analysis), with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (nongovern-
ment employment analysis).
273 Sullivan, supra note 123, at 1427.
274 The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27 See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
276 See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997)
(holding that restrictions did not impermissibly burden any fundamental right because
"Congress' refusal to fund the restricted activities here leaves the indigent clients with
the same choices they would have had absent the creation of the LSC"); see also Re-
cent Legislation, supra note 119, at 1350-51 (discussing how the prohibition on chal-
lenging welfare laws denies equal protection and due process to LSC clients).
277 See Recent Legislation, supra note 119, at 1300 (reviewing equal protection anal-
ysis); see also Maura Irene Strassberg, Note, The Constitutionality of Excluding Deseg-
regation from the Legal Services Program, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1984).
27 The federalism question concerns whether the LSC can constitutionally apply
restrictions to funds contributed by state and local governments. See generally Mark
Hansen, Loosening Congress' Purse Strings, 83 A.B.A. J. 28 (1997), Nancy J. Moore,
Ethical Issues in Third-Party Payment. Beyond the Insurance Defense Paradigm, 16
REV. LrmG. 585, 629-30 (1997).
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with a host of questions related to the professional and ethical responsibility
attorneys have to their clients.279 This Note only addresses the First
Amendment rights implicated.
The restrictions prohibiting lobbying and influencing government impli-
cate a right at the core of the First Amendment: the right to engage in clas-
sic political speech." ° Because the restrictions prohibit speech on matters
of great public concern, such as welfare reform, abortion, and redistricting,
courts must review the 1996 OCRAA and regulations with great scruti-
ny. 1 By restricting grantees' ability to influence and lobby the govern-
ment on behalf of the poor, Congress clearly implicated rights within the
purview of the First Amendment.
Restricting the clients grantees may serve implicates the grantees'. and
clients' right to freedom of association and also may impermissibly intrude
into the specially protected attorney-client sphere. "[S]tate action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny."" 2 Moreover, some of the restrictions limiting the types of cases
279 See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 399
(1996) (discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers whose employers receive funds to
their existing and future clients when such funding is reduced and when remaining
funding is subject to restrictive conditions) [hereinafter A.B.A. Opinion], discussed in
Elizabeth K. Thorp & Kimberly A. Weber, Recent Opinions from the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1009, 1039 (1996); Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal
Services Attorneys: Redefining Professional Norms and Obligations, 4 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 39 (1994).
. See Landmark Communications, Inc., v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978)
("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs."); California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972) (holding the right of petition for all depart-
ments of the government); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding
that the defendant's act of burning the American flag was protected by the First
Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (reversing a conviction for
an improper use of American flags); Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (re-
versing a conviction for the unauthorized wearing of an army uniform); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding as insufficient a public official's
libel action against critics of his official conduct). See generally ALEXANDER
MEIKELIOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
SMOLLA, supra note 15, at 12-17.
" See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) (upholding teachers' right to speak freely on the allotment of funds).
282 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); see Board of Dirs. of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) ("[ljmpediments to the exercise of one's
right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association protected by the
First Amendment . . . .") (quoting Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n.4
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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and the manner in which the cases may be litigated implicate a client's right
to access the courts. Such a right was specifically upheld in NAACP v. But-
ton 3 for the "advancement of beliefs and ideas."'  The Court also has
held that litigation involving purely personal matters is likewise protect-
ed:
285
[T]he First Amendment does not protect speech and
assembly only to the extent that it can be characterized as
political. "Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was
insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely
religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and
a free press are not confined to any field of human inter-
est."
286
The Court's holdings appear to recognize a per se right to access the
courts, regardless of whether the petition has larger social and political rami-
fications or is purely personal in nature.28' Clearly, under Button and In re
Primus, access to the courts on matters of political and social importance or
to seek protection of constitutional rights are scrupulously protected.28
- 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute
that prohibited advocacy of litigation against the State and attorney solicitation of cli-
ents.
Id. at 430. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, wrote:
[A]bstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the
Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, cer-
tainly lawful ends, against governmental intrusion .... Groups which find them-
selves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the
courts .... And under the conditions of modem government, litigation may well
be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of griev-
ances .... For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. Thus we have affirmed the
right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas."
Id. at 429-30; see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
215 See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
286 Id. at 223 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)); see also United
Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971) (reaffirming "the First Amend-
ment principle that groups can unite to assert their legal rights as effectively and eco-
nomically as practicable").
" "[T]he right to file a court action stands, in the words of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886), as his most 'fundamental political right, because preservative of
all rights."' Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
28 The Court in Legal Aid Society v. Legal Services. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D.
Haw. 1997), appeared uncertain as to the scope of the right to access the courts but
stated that "[a]t a minimal ... the right of meaningful access must encompass the right
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Therefore, the 1996 OCRAA restrictions prohibiting litigation involving
redistricting, abortion, and welfare reform directly implicate this protected
right. Furthermore, the ban on class actions, while technically only a proce-
dural limitation, also implicates this right because class actions allow the
poor to remedy widespread injustice and to effectuate broad social and po-
litical changes important to the poor.289
Because the restrictions on LSC grantees intrude into the protected attor-
ney-client sphere and impact fundamental constitutional rights, such as the
right to lobby and influence the government, the right to freedom of associ-
ation, and the right to have meaningful access to the courts, the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine is applicable.
3. Evaluating the Constitutionality of the Restrictions
The fact that fundamental rights are at stake is not dispositive in the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine because the doctrine is not absolute.2'
Therefore, the remaining question is whether the congressional restrictions
violate the Constitution according to the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions.
a. Characterizing the Relationship Between the LSC and Funding
Recipients
Arguably, the most critical part of the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions analysis is how the relationship between the LSC and grantees is char-
acterized."' In fact, this determination is likely to be dispositive of the
constitutionality of many of the restrictions. If the grantees are characterized
as independent actors, as were the funding recipients in Rosenberger, then
more exacting standards apply to "the state['s] attempts to restrict the inde-
pendent contributions of citizens to public discourse, even if those contribu-
tions are subsidized."2' If, however, the grantees are government agents
who have been enlisted to transmit a governmental message, as were the
funding recipients in Rust, then the First Amendment protections are signifi-
to vindicate constitutional rights." Id. at 1409.
"9 The author of this Note disagrees with the Court's conclusion in Legal Aid Soc'y
that "[t]he Court ... finds it imprudent to constitutionalize the rules of civil procedure
absent any appellate precedent." Id. at 1410. One must wonder what meaningful access
to the courts entails when the very procedure that gives "meaningful" access to the
courts are restricted. The Court is inconsistent and illogical to conclude that a constitu-
tional right to meaningful access to the courts exists, but that restrictions that limit such
access do not implicate the right.
290 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
292 See Post, supra note 123, at 155.
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cantly curtailed because it is the government itself participating in the politi-
cal marketplace.293 Ultimately, whether LSC grantees fall within the
Rosenberger or Rust characterizations is a "very specific, context-bound
judgment, informed by the particular First Amendment considerations rele-
vant to determining the boundaries of public discourse."294
The fact that grantees receive funding from the LSC is not determinative
of the relationship, although it is an important consideration.' In the con-
text of LSC grantees, the nature of the relationship can be best evaluated by
looking at three criteria: (1) the purpose of the LSC Act, (2) the structure of
the LSC, and (3) the special nature of the attorney-client relationship im-
pacted by the restrictions.
First, the purpose of the LSC Act is to "provide equal access to the
system of justice in our Nation for individuals who seek redress of griev-
ances."'296 Providing high quality legal assistance to those who otherwise
are unable to afford it "will serve best the ends of justice and assist in im-
proving opportunities for low-income persons."'297 The declaration states
that "to preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free
from the influence of or use by it of political pressures. ', 298 To that end,
the Act requires that attorneys providing legal assistance have full freedom
to protect the best interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of
the legal profession.2 The plain language of the LSC Act's declaration of
purpose clearly mandates that the legal services program be of an indepen-
dent and autonomous nature, free from political pressures.
Second, Congress specifically established the LSC as a private, nonprofit
corporation and not as a governmental agency. 3" Congress also created a
293 See Michael H. Hartmann, Spitting Distance: Tents Full of Religious Schools in
Choice Programs & The Camels Nose of State Labor-Law Application to Their Rela-
tions with Lay Faculty Members, and the First Amendment's Tether, 6 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 553, 632 (1997).
294 Post, supra note 123, at 157.
295
Subsidization is merely one of many possible connections between a speaker and
the state. All of these connections, including subsidization, must be assessed to
determine whether particular speakers in particular circumstances ought constitu-
tionally to be regarded as independent participants in the processes of democratic
self-governance, and hence whether their speech ought to receive the First
Amendment protections extended to public discourse.
Id. at 162.
296 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1) (1994). For the entire declaration of purpose for the LSC
Act, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
297 42 U.S.C. § 2996(3) (1994).
29. Id. § 2996(5).
299 See id. § 2996(6).
" See supra text accompanying notes 267-68.
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decentralized mechanism for delivering legal services to clients through
local legal aid organizations. The legal aid organizations are entities inde-
pendent from the LSC, that set their own priorities and are governed by a
board of directors from the community. Therefore, the legal services pro-
gram created by the LSC Act contains two levels of independence from
government control: the LSC itself and the local legal aid organizations that
receive LSC funding. The purpose and structure of the LSC Act support the
conclusion that Congress did not fund the legal services program to advance
a particular governmental position; rather, Congress funded the legal servic-
es program to protect the best interests of low-income individuals by provid-
ing them with an independent attorney, similar to an attorney that a person
would receive if he or she could afford one.30'
Third, the restrictions at issue impinge on the special attorney-client
relationship-a relationship that has been given special constitutional protec-
tion to protect attorneys' independent judgment on behalf of their cli-
ents.3°2 The Court thus has recognized that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a
person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such
legal services. 30 3 Furthermore, the professional rules of conduct governing
attorneys also require that attorneys exercise independent judgment," 4 act
competently, 35  and represent clients zealously.' The attorney-client
relationship, therefore, should be classified as "a traditional sphere of free
expression [and association] [ J fundamental to the functioning of our soci-
ety .
,,37
The above three criteria distinguish the nature of the LSC-grantee rela-
tionship from the government-doctor relationship at issue in Rust.3°8 First,
301 In fact, during the legislative debates, supporters of the LSC bill cautioned against
placing more restrictions on the activities of legal aid attorneys than those of private
attorneys because it would create a double standard. See 119 CONG. REC. S40468
(1973) ("No attorney shall be forced to violate the canons of ethics by providing less
than the full range of legal services to eligible clients.") (statement of Sen. Gaylord
Nelson); id. at H20706 (1973) (statement of Rep. Lloyd Meeds).
302 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (confirming a public defender's
professional independence).
303 Id. at 321.
304 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1996); see also
Galowitz, supra note 95, at 68-72; A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 279, at 5-7.
305 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.1 (1996).
301 See id. Rule 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.").
307 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
308 Although the Velazquez court summarily concluded that the restrictions did not
significantly impinge upon the attorney-client relationship, it never discussed the appro-
priate characterization of the relationship. Indeed, both the Hawaii and Velazquez courts
seemed to assume that Rust controlled without even discussing the differences between
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the purpose of Title X programs, as the Court noted in Rosenberger, is not
"to encourage private speech but instead [to use] private speakers to trans-
mit specific information pertaining to [the government's] own program. ' 3""
The statutory language provides for the enlistment of public and private
entities to assist the government in establishing "acceptable" family planning
"projects."31 The purpose of Title X was not to fund independent, autono-
mous doctors to provide family planning services, but, rather, to use private
entities to communicate a specific governmental message.
Moreover, the structure of Title X funding is completely different from
that of LSC funding. Because the purpose of Title X is to communicate a
government message, the funds are administered through a governmental
agency-the Department of Health and Human Services-and not through a
specially created private corporation. This is very different from using the
LSC to administer funds to legal services programs.
The Court in Rust also concluded that the Title X regulations did "not
significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship. ' 1' As the Court
noted, the "doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program [is
not] sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part
of the patient of comprehensive medical advice."3"' Such is not the case
with the LSC Act, which purports to provide low-income individuals with
comprehensive legal services, similar to the services provided by private
attorneys.313 Thus, the purpose of the Act is to provide low-income clients
with attorneys who can provide comprehensive legal services. Unlike the
limited Title X restrictions, the restrictions in the LSC Act and 1996
OCRAA are far more comprehensive and restrictive in their impact on the
protected attorney-client relationship.314
the doctor-government relationship in Rust, in which the government funded private
agents to communicate a government message about family planning, and the legal aid
attorney-government relationship, in which the government funds independent actors to
provide legal services to needy clients. The courts' failure to adequately analyze this
threshold question fatally flawed their subsequent constitutional analyses. As already
noted, the way the recipient-government relationship is characterized is likely disposi-
tive of the constitutional questions.
309 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995);
see also Recent Legislation, supra note 119, at 1350.
30 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1994). "The Secretary is authorized to make grants to and
enter into contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establish-
ment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad
range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services." Id. (emphasis
added).
311 Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
312 Id.
313 See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
314 See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp 1402 (D. Haw. 1997);
Varshavsky v. Geller, No. 40767/91, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996), reprinted in
1998] 875
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Unlike Rust, the government-recipient relationship in Rosenberger pro-
vides a better comparison to the relationship at issue in the LSC Act. At
issue in Rosenberger were restrictions placed on Student Activities Funds
(SAF) at the University of Virginia. The purpose of the SAF was to support
a wide range of extracurricular student activities that the University believed
would enhance the educational environment. 315 Thus, the purpose was not
to transmit a government message through the student organizations, but to
encourage "a diversity of views from private speakers."3"'
The University's funding structure further supported the independent
nature of the recipients. For example, to apply for SAF, a student group had
to become a "Contracted Independent Organization" (CIO), which required,
inter alia, that the CIO be independent of the University and that the Uni-
versity not be responsible for the CIO.3"7 Finally, the restrictions on SAF
impacted a specially protected sphere-the university setting.38 The simi-
larities between SAF and LSC funds are striking: Both were designed to
facilitate the speech of private actors, not to communicate a governmental
message; both were structured to ensure the independence of the recipients
from the government financier; and both involved spheres deserving height-
ened constitutional protection.
Based on the purpose, structure, and special attorney-client relationship
at issue in the LSC Act, the correct characterization of the government-
grantee relationship is one in which the grantee is an independent actor.
This characterization is important because it impacts the substantive consti-
tutional analysis to be applied to the LSC restrictions."9
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 30, 1996, at 22 (col. 2).
315 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825
(1995).
316 Id. at 834.
117 See id. at 834-35. The Court concluded:
The distinction between the University's own favored message and the private
speech of students is evident in the case before us. The University itself has taken
steps to ensure the distinction in the agreement each CIO must sign. The Univer-
sity declares that the student groups ... are not the University's agents, are not
subject to its control, and are not its responsibility.
Id. at 834.
311 See id. at 836. ("For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particu-
lar viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in
one of the vital centers for the nation's intellectual life, its college and university cam-
puses.")
311 See text accompanying note 140.
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b. The Neutrality Principle
Although grantees are independent actors, Congress may still set the
parameters (i.e., establish a limited forum) as to how grantees spend federal
funds. Therefore, content-based restrictions that are necessary to confine the
forum "to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may
justify the [government] in reserving it for certain groups or for the discus-
sion of certain topics" and thus may be constitutionally permissible.32
However, the restrictions that target not just content (the boundaries of the
forum), but specific views within the forum, are unconstitutional32' regard-
less of whether alternative channels exist for grantees to express such views
using non-LSC funds.
Many of the 1996 OCRAA restrictions are valid content-based restric-
tions that limit the forum within which funds may be used. Thus, restric-
tions that prevent grantees from engaging in redistricting litigation22 and
that prohibit the representation of aliens,323 prisoners," or tenants that
have been charged with illegal drug activity and evicted from public housing
projects all are permissible content-based restrictions that define the bound-
aries of the limited public forum.3" Similar, but a bit more difficult, is the
restriction prohibiting "training programs for the purpose of advocating a
particular public policy or encouraging a political activity, a labor or anti-
labor activity, a boycott, picketing, a strike, or a demonstration,'321 6 Al-
though this restriction appears only to be content-based and consequently a
valid limitation on how LSC funding may be used, one wonders if the view-
point-neutral veneer accurately represents the underlying motivation, which
likely was based on suppressing a particular viewpoint.
Two of the nineteen restrictions constitute viewpoint discrimination and
consequently are unconstitutional. The most blatant of these is the restriction
prohibiting "litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to re-
form a Federal or State welfare system .... .327 This restriction goes be-
320 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827-31.
321 See id.; FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984) ("A
regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expres-
sion of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest
example of a 'law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."') (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980)).
" See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1321.
2 See id. § 504(a)(11).
324 See id. § 504(a)(15).
3 See id. § 504(a)(17).
326 Id. § 504(a)(12).
327 Id. § 504(a)(16).
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yond simply establishing the boundaries of LSC activities; it regulates the
debate over welfare by effectively limiting the number of individuals avail-
able and likely to present viewpoints favorable to the poor. By conditioning
funding on a grantee's agreement not to challenge welfare reform, Congress
has engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
The second restriction that constitutes viewpoint discrimination is that
which prohibits any litigation related to abortion.3"* Although at first blush
this regulation appears to discriminate on content and not on viewpoint, "the
distinction is not a precise one." '329 It is clear that the purpose of this re-
striction was Congress's opposition to abortion 3 ° The fact that the Court
upheld restrictions on abortion counseling in Rust is not necessarily determi-
native in the case of the LSC. Rust should be viewed as standing for the
proposition that Congress engages in viewpoint discrimination, and may do
so when it provides funds to government agents communicating a govern-
ment message. Rust should not be viewed as standing for the proposition
that prohibiting abortion-related counseling is not viewpoint discrimination
at all. One hardly can argue that favoring child birth over abortion does not
constitute viewpoint discrimination. The abortion restrictions in Rust were
constitutional not because they did not discriminate on viewpoint, but be-
cause the doctors were communicating a pro-birth governmental message.
LSC grantees, however, are independent actors, so Congress cannot constitu-
tionally engage in viewpoint discrimination by prohibiting abortion-related
litigation.3 ' Consequently, the restriction prohibiting litigation related to
abortion constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
c. The Precision Principle
The precision principle requires that regulations that infringe upon tradi-
tional spheres of free expression be precise and narrowly tailored.332 Be-
fore determining whether the 1996 OCRAA restrictions and LSC rules are
subject to the vagueness and overbreadth doctrine, two questions must be
answered affirmatively. First, is the attorney-client relationship a traditional
sphere protected from government regulations, even when subsidized by the
" See id. § 504(a)(14).
329 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
330 Whether Congress's motivation in enacting the legislation should be used to deter-
mine if the regulations constitute viewpoint, discrimination is unclear. See United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("[Tlhe decisions of this court from the beginning
lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise
of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the
power to be exerted.") (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 158-70.
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government?333 Second, do the regulations and restrictions significantly
impinge upon the attorney-client relationship?3"
The first question must be answered affirmatively. "[Tihe lawyer-client
relationship ... treads deeply in waters bound up in First Amendment sensi-
bilities." '335 Indeed, the Court has scrupulously guarded the attorney-client
relationship from excessive government regulation.336 Thus, the attorney-
client relationship is a special sphere that is fundamental to this country's
system of justice and must be regulated only with the utmost caution.
The answer to the second question-whether the regulations significant-
ly infringe upon the attorney-client relationship-depends in part on each
individual restriction as well as the cumulative effect of the restrictions. It is
important to recognize that effective and zealous lawyering is not easily
dissected into piecemeal components. For example, advocating for a client
may simply require the attorney to help the client complete an application to
obtain government benefits; or it may require that the attorney go to a hear-
ing to argue that the client is entitled to the benefits under the agency's
regulations; or it may require that the attorney challenge the agency's inter-
pretation of the law; or, it even may require that the attorney challenge the
law itself.337 There are no clear lines of demarcation that allow a lawyer to
stop at a prescribed point without undermining the independent nature of the
attorney-client relationship that is so vital to this country's system of justice.
Thus, whether a restriction infringes upon the attorney-client relationship
must be determined by examining whether the restriction adversely affects
the basis of this important relationship--that an advocate will zealously
represent the client's interest using every legitimate means available.
The first set of restrictions that impinges upon the attorney-client rela-
tionship is the broad set of restrictions prohibiting a legal services program
attorney from lobbying and influencing government.33 The restrictions, for
all practical purposes, completely cut off legal aid attorneys from advocating
for the rights of poor people at a larger systematic level and severely under-
... See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
331 See id.
... Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 342 (1997); see supra notes
302-07 and accompanying text.
336 See supra text accompanying notes 302-07.
117 See 45 C.F.R. § 1639 (1996). The regulations discuss comments the LSC received
regarding the proposed LSC rules prohibiting grantees from challenging an agency's
regulation. One comment stated that "when representing clients before agencies, legal
aid attorneys must often either challenge the agency's interpretation of the law or. at
least lay the foundation for such a challenge, should an effort to win benefits for the
client under the agency's regulations fail." Id. "A point made by many comments was
that, in order to represent clients properly in public benefits cases, an attorney must be
able to challenge existing law." Id.
33 See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
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mines their ability to represent individual clients."' In addition, the restric-
tions prohibiting legal aid attorneys from engaging in welfare reform, com-
bined with the LSC's broad interpretation of what constitutes "welfare,"
further limits a grantee's ability to zealously advocate for a poor client."
Such broad restrictions on lobbying, influencing government, and engaging
in welfare reform strike at the heart of an independent, zealous advocate.
The restrictions limiting class actions and the recovery of statutory
attorneys' fees also directly undermine the effectiveness of the representa-
tion legal aid attorneys provide." By prohibiting the use of these litiga-
tion devices, Congress has removed important tools necessary to advocate
for poor clients.
Because the restrictions significantly infringe upon the attorney-client
relationship, the government must have a substantial purpose for the restric-
tions and regulate the relationship in a precise manner. 2 Although the
purpose of the restrictions prohibiting lobbying and limiting the use of class
actions and the recovery of attorneys' fees is unclear form the 1996
OCRAA and from the rules promulgated by the LSC, it appears the restric-
tions reflect Congress's attempt to limit the perceived misuse of federal
funds by legal aid attorneys. Congress clearly has a substantial purpose in
ensuring that federal funds are used properly. Thus, the pertinent question is
whether the 1996 OCRAA and accompanying LSC regulations are
overbroad or vague.
The restrictions on class actions and the recovery of attorneys' fees are
neither overbroad nor vague. In fact, they are quite straightforward, and the
scope of the restrictions are easily understood. Accordingly, these restric-
tions satisfy the precision principle because the regulations are narrowly
tailored to achieve a substantial purpose.
The restrictions on lobbying and influencing government, however, are
anything but straightforward or easily understood. Of particular concern are
the all encompassing definitions of grassroots lobbying, legislation, public
policy, and rule making found in the LSC regulations.4 3 Because of the
indelible scope of these terms, the LSC rules are inordinate in magnitude.
One cannot review the LSC rules and conclude they are precise and nar-
rowly tailored. To the contrary, Congress and the LSC enacted and promul-
gated comprehensive restrictions against grantees lobbying and influencing
the government. Indeed, Congress's intent was to silence the perceived "lib-
eral" legal aid attorneys." The restrictions, however, sweep too broadly
... See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
3" See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
3 See supra text accompanying notes 75-82.
342 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967).
3 See supra text accompanying notes 35-50.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
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and will impermissibly chill speech. These regulations go way beyond
Congress's purpose in ferreting out misuse of federal funds and "reflect[ ]
an impermissible attempt 'to allow [the] government [to] control ... the
search for political truth. "5
The restrictions on influencing government, including the specific prohi-
bition related to welfare-reform advocacy, are constitutionally deficient on
overbreadth and vagueness grounds. If Congress and the LSC want to regu-
late the protected attorney-client relationship by attaching conditions to its
funding, they must create regulations that further the government's interest
in a much more precisely and narrowly tailored fashion.
d. The Proportionality Principle
The proportionality principle is based on the premise that any restric-
tions the government attaches to its funding must be in proportion to the
government's financial contribution.' The question, therefore, is whether
Congress's extension of the 1996 OCRAA restrictions to non-LSC funds
combined with the LSC's rules regulating affiliate organizations violates the
proportionality principle. The answer to this question depends upon whether
grantees have adequate alternative channels for engaging in the prohibited
activities. As previously discussed at length, the final regulations promulgat-
ed by the LSC in May of 1997 implemented "program integrity" standards.
The LSC regulations were based on regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary of Health for the Title X programs that the Court in Rust upheld as
constitutional. 47
In Hawaii II and Velazquez, both courts decided that Rust was determi-
native of the issue, holding that the regulations did not violate the propor-
tionality principle because they offered adequate alternative channels of
communication similar to what was available for the Title X doctors.S
Rust, however, is not controlling because the Title X doctors were govern-
ment agents, not independent actors. In Hawaii II, the court errantly con-
cluded that Regan, League of Women Voters, and Rust all represented a
continuum of acceptable restrictions on affiliate organizations' ability to
engage in restricted activities. 9 These cases are not continuums; rather,
they represent different standards, depending upon the government-recipient
relationship.35 On the one hand, Regan and League of Women Voters rep-
L eague of Women Voters v. FCC, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984).
346 See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 190-205; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991).
" See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 981 F. Supp 1288 (1997); VelazqueZ
v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (1997).
9 See Hawaii II, 981 F. Supp. at 1291.
31 Such a distinction makes sense. When the government is communicating its own
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resent the Court's pronouncement of the appropriate standards for establish-
ing an affiliate organization when the government attaches restrictions to
funds used by independent actors. On the other hand, Rust represents the
appropriate standard when the government attaches restrictions to funds used
by private parties who are conveying a government message. Therefore, the
extensive restrictions approved in Rust would not pass constitutional muster
if imposed on independent actors.35" '
message through private actors, the government has a much greater interest in ensuring
that "there is no identification of the recipient with restricted activities and that the
[affiliate] is not a sham or paper organization and is not so closely identified with the
recipient that there might be confusion or misunderstanding about the recipient's in-
volvement with or endorsement of prohibited activities." Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at
339. Conversely, when the government funds independent actors, the public at large is
less likely to be confused that the government is endorsing the activities of the indepen-
dent actors. Indeed, the only substantial interest Congress would have in regulating
affiliate organizations would be to ensure that federal funds were not used by the affili-
ate.
3 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 & n.6 (1983).
Justice Blackmun specifically addressed the limited nature of the restrictions that could
be placed on affiliate organizations, in that case section 501(c)(4) entities:
Given this relationship between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4), the Court finds that
Congress' purpose in imposing the lobbying restriction was merely to ensure that
"no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying." Consis-
tent with that purpose, "[t]he IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be
separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible
contributions are not used to pay for lobbying." As long as the IRS goes no fur-
ther than this, we perhaps can safely say that "[tjhe Code does not deny TWR the
right to receive deductible contributions to support its nonlobbying activity, nor
does it deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its intention to lobby."
A § 501(c)(3) organization's right to speak is not infringed, bedause it is free to
make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) affiliate without los-
ing tax benefits for its nonlobbying activities.
Any significant restriction on this channel of communication, however, would
negate the saving effect of § 501(c)(4). It must be remembered that § 501(c)(3)
organizations retain their constitutional right to speak and to petition the Govern-
ment. Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise
over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems
would be insurmountable. It hardly answers one person's objection to a restriction
on his speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him. Simi-
larly, an attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying explicitly on
behalf of their § 501(c)(3) affiliates would perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations'
inability to make known their views on legislations without incurring the uncon-
stitutional penalty. Such restrictions would extend far beyond Congress' mere
refusal to subsidize lobbying. In my view, any such restriction would render the
statutory scheme unconstitutional.
Id. at 553 (citations omitted).
JUSTICE OR INJUSTICE FOR THE POOR?
Thus, if Regan, rather than Rust, is the correct standard for measuring
the constitutionality of LSC regulations on affiliate organizations, then the
government cannot regulate affiliate organizations established by indepen-
dent actors who receive federal funding other than by requiring that the
affiliate be a separate legal entity and maintain records documenting that no
federal funds were used for a prohibited activity.352 Imposing additional
requirements on affiliate organizations of independent actors (as compared
to those of government agents) would be disproportionate to the
government's funding and beyond its legitimate interest in these entities.353
Congress may regulate how independent actors spend LSC funds, but it
cannot regulate how independent actors spend non-LSC funds through affili-
ate entities. Therefore, the restrictions requiring that affiliate organizations
satisfy program integrity standards before they can use non-LSC funds for
restricted activities are disproportionate to the government's funding. Hence,
every regulation that implicates a constitutional right is unconstitutional as
applied to affiliate organizations.
CONCLUSION
Part III applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the restric-
tions Congress and the LSC placed on grantees. The restrictions impact vital
First Amendment rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of associa-
tion, and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. The
restrictions also interfere with the constitutionally protected attorney-client
relationship. Because legal aid attorneys are independent participants in the
political marketplace and not instruments of the government, the restrictions
must be reviewed with the strictest of scrutiny.
The two restrictions that prohibit welfare-reform advocacy and abortion-
related litigation are unconstitutional because they constitute viewpoint dis-
crimination. Additionally, the restrictions on lobbying and influencing gov-
ernment are impermissibly overbroad. Finally, LSC restrictions that require
affiliate organizations to satisfy program integrity requirements unconstitu-
tionally restrict grantees' use of non-LSC funds to engage in restricted activ-
ities through affiliate organizations; such restrictions violate the proportion-
ality principle. Thus, although the purpose of the legal services program was
to provide justice for the poor, many of these new restrictions unfortunately
only create more injustice.
J. DWIGHT YODER
352 See id.
... The problem with the two court decisions that have addressed this issue is that
both failed to answer the threshold question: What is a government-recipient relation-
ship? By failing to answer this question, the courts blindly relied on Rust, and thus
reached the wrong conclusion.
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